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The bulk of the Standards for Criminal JusticeI (Standards) relates to the
conduct of criminal proceedings and the professional activities of lawyers
and judges. In contrast, at either end of the spectrum of the criminal pro-
cess--law enforcement administration and corrections-the roles of legal
professionals are less well defined and the claims of professionals in the other
concerned professions to remain free from domination by judges and attor-
neys carry considerable weight. Nevertheless, citizens have clear legal rights
during both the inception of criminal investigations and the enforcement of
criminal sanctions. These legal rights merit effective implementation
through courts and administrative organs. On these matters the organized
bar is competent and obliged to speak. Both the first and second editions of
the Standards have addressed selected law enforcement problems in the chap-
ter on Urban Police Function.2 It was not until the second edition Standards
were far along in preparation, however, that a decision was reached to pre-
pare standards relating to the legal status of prisoners.
Indeed, that decision was arrived at rather late in a sequence of Ameri-
can Bar Association (ABA) activities which had their inception in an address
by Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, delivered at the 1969 ABA annual meet-
ing, where he urged the legal profession to focus its concern and abilities on
the administration of the nation's correctional systems.3 A few months later,
the ABA House of Delegates created a Commission on Correctional Facili-
ties and Services which, among its several reports and monographs, pro-
duced a first tentative draft of standards relating to the legal status of
prisoners.4 When the Commission and the Section of Criminal Justice
presented the draft to the House of Delegates in 1978, the House referred it
to the Standing Committee to resolve points of conflict with correctional
authorities. The committee in turn developed three successive drafts. The
fourth tentative draft was modified in several respects before final adoption
by the House in February 1981, when the draft became a new chapter
* Chairperson, ABA Standing Committee on Association Standards for Criminal Justice;
Professor of Law, New York Law School.
1. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUsTIcE (2d ed. 1980).
2. Id. ch. 1.
3. Burger, A Proposal: A National Conference on Correctional Problems, MONOGRAPH
3, ABA SECTION OF INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILrrIES, Edited Proceedings 1 (1969,
Dallas, Texas) (luncheon address presented at the annual ABA meeting to the Sections on Indi-
vidual Rights and Responsibilities, Criminal Law, Bar Activities, Judicial Administration, and
the Special Committee on Crime Prevention and Control).
4. CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECTION PROJECT ON STANDARDS RELATING TO THE LEGAL STA-
TUS OF PRISONERS (Tent. Draft No. 1), 14 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 377 (1977).
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twenty-three of the Standards.5
The Legal Status of Prisoners Standards6 (LSOP) constitute but one of sev-
eral national and international bodies of rules or standards. The United
Nations has undertaken to implement the premise that no person should be
subjected to cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment. 7 The
United States National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards
and Goals in 1973 issued detailed standards bearing on correctional adminis-
tration," and the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws covered many of the same concerns in its Model Sentencing and Corrections
Act. 9 Since 1975, the American Correctional Association and the Commis-
sion on Accreditation for Corrections have published ten volumes of stan-
dards to govern accreditation of correctional facilities. Three of those
volumes bear substantially on the problems dealt with in the ABA Stan-
dards. '0 Most recently, the United States Department of Justice issued stan-
dards governing prisons and jails for use in federal penal administration.II
Thus, during the 1980s there is no dearth of guidelines for correctional ad-
ministration and judicial evaluation of the country's penal facilities.
This article surveys the legal and administrative status of prisoners
under the several contending standards, noting in the process the points on
which the ABA Standards diverge substantially from other bodies of
principles.
I. PRINCIPAL RIGHTS OR CLAIMS OF PRISONERS
A. Basic Principle
It must be stressed that the ABA's choice of the word "status", rather
5. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, LEGAL STATUS OF PRISONERS (Approved
Draft, 1981) [hereinafter cited as LSOP].
6. Id
7. Declaration on the Protection ofAll Persons From Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punshment (G.A. Res. 2200, U.N. Doc. A/34/273 Annex passim [June 6, 1979]);
International Covenant on Civil and Pohlital Rights, art. 7, 10 (G.A. Res. 2200 A[XXI] [December 16,
1966]); Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (U.N. Doc. Sales No. 1956 IV.4,
Annex [1958] [hereinafter cited as UN Standard Minimum Rules]); Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, art. 5 (G.A. Res. 217A [III] [December 10, 1948]). Draft Body of Principlesfor the Protection
of All Persons Under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment (A/34/146, Annex [September 11, 1979])
is under circulation to member states for comments. United Nations materials at times are cited
in American prison litigation. See, e.g., Lareau v. Manson, 507 F. Supp. 1177, 1187 n.9 (D.
Conn. 1980); Sterling v. Cupp, 290 Or. 611, 625 P.2d 123, 131 n.21 (1981).
8. U.S. NAT'L ADVISORY COMM'N ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND GOALS, RE-
PORT ON CORRECTIONS (1973) [hereinafter cited as NAC CORRECTIONS].
9. 10 UNIFORM RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, MODEL SENTENCING AND CORREC-
TIONS ACT, (Approved Draft, 1979) [hereinafter cited as MODEL ACT].
10. AMERICAN CORRECTIONAL ASSOCIATION, STANDARDS FOR ADULT CORRECTIONAL
INSTITUTIONS (2d ed. 1981) [hereinafter cited as ACA-ACI]; STANDARDS FOR ADULT LOCAL
DETENTION FACILITIES (2d ed. 1981) [hereinafter cited as ACA-ALDF; STANDARDS FOR THE
ADMINISTRATION OF CORRECTIONAL AGENCIES (1979) [hereinafter cited as ACA-ACA]. See
also note 312 infa.
11. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FEDERAL STANDARDS FOR PRISONS AND JAILS (Dec. 16, 1980)
[hereinafter cited as DOJ]. See also changes in the preamble, 46 Fed. Reg. 39515 (Aug. 3, 1981).
The National Sheriffs Association issued a set of seven monographs in 1974 governing local jail
administration, which are available from the ABA, 1250 Connecticut, Suite 320, Washington,
D.C. 20036.
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than the word "rights", of prisoners was not casual or heedless. It was, in-
stead, a statement of philosophy that the purpose of the ABA is not to pro-
vide an advance guard in a drive to expand prisoner rights beyond those
now recognized by courts and legislatures, but to delineate the position of
prisoners in relation to free citizens, on the one hand, and governmental
authority, on the other. That is the thrust of standard 23-1.1:
Prisoners retain the rights of free citizens except: (a) as specifically
provided to the contrary in these standards; or (b) when restric-
tions are necessary to assure their orderly confinement and interac-
tion; or (c) when restrictions are necessary to provide reasonable
protection for the rights and physical safety of all members of the
prison system and the general public.'
2
This restates in essence the constitutional principles enunciated by the
United States Supreme Court.'3 Standard 23-1.1 sets out a general philoso-
phy which, however, is subject to qualification by the language of more spe-
cific standards.
B. Reception, Classiftcation, Assignment, and Transfer
Classification is necessary in any prison system having more than one
general holding facility. A failure to provide a diversity of classifications
itself violates modern notions of penal administration.14 There are at least
three bases for categorizing correctional facilities:
1. Security Classifications
Traditionally, facilities in the United States have been categorized as
maximum, medium, and minimum security institutions, without any partic-
ular standards according to which a designation can be made. The opera-
tive issue, from the standpoint of individual prisoners, is the extent to which
freedom of movement is controlled within a facility. On such a basis one
may perceive, in decreasing order of severity, administrative segregation,
maximum custody, close custody, medium security, minimum security, and
community status.' 5 Unless facilities are categorized, rational assignment of
individual prisoners is difficult to achieve.
2. Classification According to Objective Personal Characteristics
To some extent everywhere, separate facilities are provided for adults
and young offenders, male and female offenders, pre- and post-adjudication
detainees, and civilly and criminally incarcerated persons. 16 Classification
12. LSOP, supra note 5, § 23-1.1.
13. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 544-48 (1979); see also Rhodes v. Chapman, 101 S. Ct.
2392, 2400 n.13 (1981).
14. ACA-ACI, supra note 10, § 2-4399; ACA-ACA, supra note 10, §§ 25, 27.
15. E.g., MICH. ADMIN. CODE R. 791.4401(3) (1977). The discussion to ACA-ACI, supra
note 10, § 2-4401, recommends at least three degrees of custodial control for inmates. The
MODEL AcT, supra note 9, § 4-402, contains somewhat different criteria: each facility or portion
of a facility should be given a security classification based on the extent of perimeter security,
freedom of movement of confined persons within a facility, nature of programs in a facility, and
the extent of regimentation of confined persons within a facility.
16. See, e.g., DOJ, supra note 11, §§ 9.03-.05; ACA-ACA, supra note 10, §§ 2, 11-13, 16, 26;
1981]
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under such a system is objective and mechanical; the primary limitation i's
that no discriminatory use can be made of external factors, particularly race,
religion, sex, age, or handicapped status.
17
3. Classification Based On Individualized Treatment Needs
Penal legislation determines the extent to which prisoners are to be pro-
vided programs tailored to fit individual needs. If offender rehabilitation is
the principal or a significant objective of a criminal justice system, and deter-
rence of future criminal conduct and segregation or incapacitation are of
minimal significance, then substantial financial and personnel resources will
be devoted to "treatment" of offenders.' 8 In contrast, if rehabilitation
largely has been abandoned as a goal of a prison system and incarceration
for a determinate or relatively fixed term is either punishment to deter crime
or a means of segregating dangerous persons from society,' 9 then subjective
personal characteristics of individual prisoners will play a relatively small
role in penal administration, and classification largely will turn on factors in
(1) and (2) above.
4. Administrative Procedures Affecting Classification
Correctional standards are more concerned with administrative proce-
dures affecting classification than they are with criteria for classification gen-
erated in substantive law. Granted that conceptual limitation, there are
several important dimensions of prisoner claims and protections in the set-
ting of classification:
Time of classiftatton. Classification should be conducted as soon after a
prisoner has been received in a prison system or facility as is possible in light
ACA-ACI, supra note 10, §§ 2-4332; ACA-ALDF, supra note 10, § 2-5354-5355. A "Central
Monitoring Case" (CMC) system instituted by the Federal Bureau of Prisons imposes stricter
controls over some prisoners than others because of their criminal careers. Attacks have been
made on assignment to such a status without a prior administrative hearing, with varying re-
sults. Compare Pugliese v. Nelson, 617 F.2d 916 (2d Cir. 1980) (no hearing required) with Bryant
v. Carlson, 489 F. Supp. 1075 (M.D. Pa. 1980) (hearing required).
17. LSOP, supra note 5, § 23-6.14; DOJ, supra note 11, § 1.02; MODEL ACT, supra note 9,
§ 4-111; ACA-ACI, supra note 10, § 2-4340; ACA-ALDF, supra note 10, § 2-5356; see also U.N.
Standard Minimum Rules, supra note 7, R. 6(1). This is federal constitutional doctrine. Lee v.
Washington, 390 U.S. 333 (1968); Jones v. Diamond, 594 F.2d 997 (5th Cir. 1979); Finney v.
Arkansas Bd. of Corrections, 505 F.2d 194 (8th Cir. 1974); Glover v. Johnson, 510 F. Supp. 1019
(E.D. Mich. 1981).
18. This is the clear objective of U.N. Standard Minimum Rules, supra note 7, R. 67(b), 69; see
also id. R. 8 ("necessities of their treatment"), 59 ("individual treatment needs of the prison-
ers"). The ABA SENTENCING ALTERNATIVES AND PROCEDURES STANDARDS, supra note 1, ch.
18, particularly §§ 18-2.1, -4.1, embody a similar approach even though deterrence and segrega-
tion loom larger in the current standards than they did in the first edition. See, e.g., id §§ 18-2.5,
-3.2.
19. Current controversies over determinate or presumptive sentencing are reflected in re-
cent works, e.g., N. MORRIS, THE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT (1974); P. O'DONNELL, M.
CHURGIN & D. CURTIS, TOWARD A JUST AND EFFECTIVE SENTENCING SYSTEM: AGENDA FOR
LEGISLATIVE REFORM (1977); A. VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE: THE CHOICE OF PUNISH-
MENTS (1976); J. WILSON, THINKING ABOUT CRIME (1975); TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND
TASK FORCE ON CRIMINAL SENTENCING, FAIR AND CERTAIN PUNISHMENT (1976); UNITED
STATES NAT'L INST. OF LAW ENFORCEMENT AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE, DETERMINATE SEN-
TENCING: REFORM OR REGRESSION? (Summary Report March, 1978).
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of the need to accumulate data appropriate to a classification decision. 20
Although the ABA standard recognizes some flexibility in completing classi-
fication,21 it recommends a thirty-day period which corresponds to other
standards covering the matter.
22
Place of dassfftcation. None of the standards attempts to regulate the lo-
cation of classification. It can be done at a central diagnostic facility and
probably must be accomplished in that way if courts are not empowered to
designate facilities to which convicted prisoners must be sent. After a first
classification and assignment have been made, each institution then has a
mechanism either for placement at a level of custody and programming
within that institution or, if for a designated period a prisoner is assigned the
highest security category within the institution, for reclassification and reas-
signment after an appropriate time has elapsed. Further transfers within a
prison system are subject to central administrative control. 23 The ABA Stan-
dards properly are silent on what is a purely administrative matter.
Classifwatton procedures. The ABA Standards are not silent as to proce-
dures pursuant to which classification decisions are reached. American stan-
dards generally contemplate an active role for prisoners during classification
which contrasts, favorably in the author's view, with the U.N. Standard Mi-
mum Ru/es 2 4 and practices in many other nations in which prisoners play a
passive, receptive role.
Due process of law does not mandate that classification or reclassifica-
tion be conducted according to procedures required for major disciplinary
proceedings, 25 even though prisoner misconduct may have impelled admin-
istrative review. 26 Consequently, the ABA Standards,27 like other rules and
20. At reception and classification, a legal basis for confinement must be documented, e.g.,
DOJ, supra note 11, §§ 8.02,.04, .05; ACA-ALDF, supra note 10, §§ 2-5099, -5344 and complete
records must be maintained on all prisoners subject to appropriate audit controls. ACA-ACI,
supra note 10, §§ 2-4115--4117.
21. LSOP, supra note 5, § 23-3.4(a) brackets the figure thirty, indicating scope for
flexibility.
22. DOJ, supra note 11, § 9.07 recommends four weeks and MODEL ACT, supra note 9, § 4-
408(c) thirty days.
23. ACA-ACI, supra note 10, § 2-4400 (discussion), suggests only that there should be "spe-
cific procedures relating to inmate transfer . . . from one institution to another."
24. U.N. Standard Mfinmum Rules, supra note 7, R. 69 ("a programme of treatment shall be
prepared for him"). Interviews by the author with prison administrators in Japan and the
People's Republic of China confirm that in those nations prisoners have no positive role to play
in the determination of work or educational programs in which they are required to participate.
25. See text accompanying notes 273-94 infra.
26. Montanye v. Haymes, 427 U.S. 236 (1976); Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215 (1976);
Goodnow v. Perrin, 421 A.2d 1008 (N.H. 1980) (even though transfer was to federal prison in
Pennsylvania). However, if some prisoners are allowed a hearing before a change in program
assignment, a failure to grant such a hearing to all prisoners within an eligible class may deny
equal protection. Durso v. Rowe, 579 F.2d 1365 (7th Cir. 1978). A state system of course is free
to institute a hearing system under its own law, In re Westfall, 102 Cal. App. 3d 328, 162 Cal.
Rptr. 462 (1980), and this may engender an entitlement to an administrative due process hear-
ing under federal doctrine. Garcia v. De Batista, 642 F.2d 11 (1st Cir. 1981); Bills v. Henderson,
631 F.2d 1287 (6th Cir. 1980); Dickerson v. Warden of Marquette Prison, 99 Mich. App. 630,
298 N.W.2d 841 (1980).
27. LSOP, supra note 5, § 23-3.4(a)-(d).
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standards,28 contemplate that procedures be as informal as possible. How-
ever, explanations must be given to prisoners about the classification process,
the options open to them, and the criteria by which decisions are reached.
The initial classification recommendations must also be communicated to
prisoners and to a classification committee. Although some lawyers and
others deeply concerned about prisoner rights have maintained that even
initial classification decisions should be adversary in nature, including par-
ticipation by counsel for prisoners desiring representation, 29 an emerging
consensus holds that adversarial proceedings are inimical to proper classifi-
cation and reclassification. The use of adversarial proceedings reflects an
"over-lawyering" which has characterized many dimensions of social welfare
administration in the United States during the past two decades.
Nevertheless, standards governing prisoner status must take account of
the possibility of abuse of discretion by classification officials. The Standards
provide an initial check through a routine review by a classification commit-
tee of preliminary classification decisions, 30 and then allow a formal classifi-
cation hearing at the request of a prisoner dissatisfied with a provisional
classification or reclassification decision.3 ' No special provision is made for
further administrative or judicial review of classification matters, because
the Standards envision grievance procedures based on a broad array of pris-
oner complaints.
32
Rre/assiftation. Initial classification determinations cannot be allowed
routinely to stand intact without further evaluation throughout a prisoner's
period of incarceration. The approach of the Standards is to require routine
periodic review at a recommended interval of six months and to allow pris-
oners to impel classification hearings if they are dissatisfied with refusals on
the basis of a document review to revise an earlier classification.33 No provi-
sion is made in the ABA Standards for interim review at the request of a
prisoner, unlike some other standards.
34
28. DOJ, supa note 11, § 9.02; MODEL AcT, supra note 9, § 4-408; ACA-ACI, supra note
10, §§ 2-4400, -4403, -4407.
29. See, e.g., LSOP (Tent. Draft No. 1), supra note 4, at 455-58, § 3.5 and commentary;
MODEL Acr, supra note 9, § 4.412(a)(1)-(iii).
30. LSOP, supra note 5, § 23-3.4(e)-(f. A similar approach is taken in DOJ, supra note 11,
§§ 9.02, .09, .10; ACA-ACA, supra note 10, §§ 32-36; ACA-ACI, supra note 10, §§ 2-4400, -
4405-4407; see also MODEL AcT, supra note 9, §§ 4-408, -412, -413.
31. LSOP, supra note 5, § 23-3 .4 (g) governs the troubling matter of the impact of pending
detainers on classification. It provides that no consideration should be given to detainers pend-
ing more than a recommended six month period, on which there has been no action by the
requesting entity despite a prisoner demand. Other detainers may be considered but should not
be given controlling weight in assigning security classifications.
32. LSOP, supra note 5, §§ 23-7. 1(d)(vii); see text accompanying notes 210-26 infra.
33. Id, § 23-3.4(c), (e).
34. DOJ, supra note 11, § 9.08 (12 month interval, or more frequently as needed; inmates
may request reviews of their progress and status, and request changes in program assignments,
at any time); ACA-ACI, supra note 10, § 2-4407 (discussion indicates that inmates should be
allowed to initiate reviews at any time to determine the extent of their progress and the effec-
tiveness of their programming).
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C. Circumstances of Confinement
Prison conditions "may deprive inmates of the minimal civilized meas-
ure of life's necessities," and so can "be cruel and unusual under the contem-
porary standard of decency" 35 developed by the Supreme Court under the
eighth amendment. Nevertheless, "to the extent that [prison] conditions are
restrictive and even harsh, they are part of the penalty that criminal offend-
ers pay for their offenses against society."' 36 Granted such a limited scope of
constitutional control over prison circumstances, criminal justice standards
have a very substantial role to play in establishing criteria by which legisla-
tors and correctional administrators should govern penal institutions and by
which courts can determine issues of constitutional adequacy.
Norms in light of which correctional facilities are accredited or in-
spected must be precise and incorporate by reference health and safety stan-
dards embodied in administrative regulations, inspection codes, and the
like. 37 The drafters of the ABA Standards recognized in this context that it is
inappropriate for the ABA to parrot, and particularly to endeavor to im-
prove upon, detailed criteria in other standards governing matters like insti-
tutional size and location, cell or dormitory dimensions, lighting, ventilation,
toilet and bathing facilities, and laundry facilities. Administrators, legisla-
tors, and judges wishing detailed norms can find them in correctional stan-
dards. Consequently, the Standards set forth only general concepts essentially
congruent with contemporary constitutional precedent. 38
Thus, correctional institutions should meet health, sanitation, fire, and
industrial safety codes applicable to private residential facilities or public
buildings like schools and hospitals, as well as any state standards directly
governing correctional facilities. 39 Although correctional administrators
bear a principal burden in practice to see that compliance is constant, they
cannot be given sole responsibility. Therefore, the Standards call for regular
inspections by qualified inspectors independent of the facility or agency un-
dergoing inspection. 4° In contrast to correctional standards, the ABA is di-
rectly concerned about enforcement of health and safety standards and calls
for the same enforcement sanctions, including abatement, and procedures
35. Rhodes v. Chapman, 101 S. Ct. 2392, 2399 (1981). See also Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d
559 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 1759 (1981).
36. Rhodes v. Chapman, 101 S. Ct. at 2399.
37. See, e.g., DOJ, supra note 11, §§ 2.01-4.16; ACA-ACI, supra note 10, §§ 2-4127--4175.
38. LSOP, supra note 5, § 23-6.13. NAC CORRECTIONS, supra note 8, § 2.5 takes a like
approach.
39. LSOP, supra note 5, § 23-6.13(a)(i)-(ii). Section 6.13(c) lists heating and ventilation
systems to maintain humane comfort, natural and artificial light in living quarters sufficient to
permit reading, an adequate balanced diet, adequate, clean and functioning private toilet and
other facilities to maintain personal cleanliness, freedom from excessive noise, clean clothing
and bedding appropriate to the season, and varied opportunities for daily physical exercise and
recreation. A cross-reference is included to medical care. See text accompanying notes 46-60
infa .
40. Id § 23-6.13(a)(iii). The preference, expressed through bracketed material, is for in-
spections at least annually, the frequency expressed also in DOJ, supra note 11, § 3.01 and ACA-
ACI, supra note 10, §§ 2-4255 (sanitation and health), -4162, -4164 (fire and related safety facili-
ties must be certified as in code compliance by independent qualified sources, and inspected
annually). Accreditation standards require daily or weekly inspections by qualified administra-
tors of each institution. Id §§ 2-4163, -4248.
19811
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governing other facilities subject to public regulatory codes.4 1
Some standards express a clear preference for single-occupancy cells
over dormitory quarters,42 although clearly that is not a constitutional
minimum standard. 43 The ABA Standards align basically with that position,
in that prisoners in other than residential (community corrections) facilities
"should have the opportunity to have their own separate living quarters of
adequate size."'44 However, some inmates clearly prefer communal living if
quarters are adequately supervised. The standard provides specifically for
staffing and other means of supervision sufficient for that purpose. 45 Safety-
related surveillance poses a conflict with inmate claims to privacy. The Stan-
dards can do no more than to urge that inmates not in separate living
quarters be given at least some opportunity daily for personal privacy.
There is no bar intended, however, against the use of closed-circuit television
surveillance of either single- or multiple-occupancy quarters to ensure pris-
oner safety and compliance with institutional safety and health regulations.
The ABA takes no position for or against disciplinary detention 46 as
long as it is specifically provided for through adequately disseminated insti-
tutional rules and does not violate the principle of parsimony because dis-
proportionate to the seriousness of misconduct for which it is a sanction.
47
If, however, prisoners are placed in a restrictive category and specially
housed, whether by way of disciplinary segregation or special administrative
classification, they are not to be deprived of whatever is needed to maintain
mental and physical well-being, including books or other reading matter,
mail, physical exercise, items for personal care and hygiene, medical care,
41. LSOP, supra note 5, § 23-6.13(a)(iv).
42. NAC CORRECTIONS, supra note 8, § 2.5(1); ACA-ACI, supra note 10, § 2-4129; cf. id
§ 2-4131 (multiple occupancy rooms must house not less than 3 nor more than 50 inmates;
facilities are specified in detail). DOJ, supra note 11, § 2.02 provides that single-occupancy cells
must house only one inmate.
43. Rhodes v. Chapman, 101 S. Ct. 2392 (1981).
44. LSOP, supra note 5, § 23-6.13(b).
45. Inmates have a constitutional claim to protection against physical or sexual assaults by
other inmates, Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559, 572 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 1759
(1981); Leonardo v. Moran, 611 F.2d 397 (Ist Cir. 1979); Bolding v. Holshouser, 575 F.2d 461
(4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 837 (1978); Little v. Walker, 552 F.2d 193 (7th Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 435 U.S. 932 (1978), and therefore institutions must have enough staff to ensure
inmate safety. Williams v. Edwards, 547 F.2d 1206 (5th Cir. 1977). Assaults by staff members
also must be prevented. Finney v. Arkansas Bd. of Corrections, 505 F.2d 194 (8th Cir. 1974).
46. Accreditation standards use the term segregation to encompass administrative segrega-
tion (based on a serious threat to life, property, self, staff, or other inmates or to the security or
orderly running of an institution), protective custody (designed to safeguard inmates either at
their request or according to a determination that they are in jeopardy), and disciplinary deten-
tion. ACA-ACI, supra note 10, § 2-4214 and discussion; see also DOJ, supra note 11, ch. 11. On
administrative procedures required for transfers to administrative segregation, see Parker v.
Cook, 642 F.2d 865 (5th Cir. 1981); Bills v. Henderson, 631 F.2d 1287 (6th Cir. 1980); Bono v.
Saxbe, 620 F.2d 609 (7th Cir. 1980); Dickerson v. Warden of Marquette Prison, 99 Mich. App.
630, 298 N.W.2d 841 (1980). Whether solitary confinement constitutes cruel and unusual pun-
ishment turns on the circumstances as well as the duration of such detention. Hutto v. Finney,
437 U.S. 678 (1978); Littlefield v. Deland, 641 F.2d 729 (10th Cir. May 12, 1981); Chavis v.
Rowe, 643 F.2d 1281 (7th Cir. 1981); Lock v. Jenkins, 641 F.2d 488 (7th Cir. 1981). See genera/ly
NAT'L ASs'N OF ATrORNEYS GENERAL, ADMINISTRATIVE SEGREGATION OF PRISONERS: DUE
PROCESS ISSUES (1979).
47. LSOP, supra note 5, § 23-3.1; see text accompanying note 266 tnfra.
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light, ventilation, regular diet, and visiting or oral communication opportu-
nities with other persons. Conditions cannot unnecessarily cause physical or
mental deterioration.
48
D. Medical Care and Dehve of Health Servi'ces
Deliberate indifference to the serious medical needs of prisoners consti-
tutes "unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain" 49 forbidden by the eighth
amendment. Because inadequate delivery of health services has been promi-
nent in prisoner litigation, the ABA Standards address basic concepts in some
detail, although not to the same extent as do the American Medical Associa-
tion50 and accrediting agencies. 5'
The basic constitutional standard is restated in section 23-5.1(a). 52 No
effort is made to specify the qualifications of those who provide medical care
in prisons, beyond requiring that they possess those qualifications expected
of medical care personnel performing like functions in the free community.
5 3
Unlike the Model Act,54 the Standards embody no right of prisoners to resort
to private medical care at personal expense, but neither do they condemn it
under the broad language of section 23-5.2(a). Although there can be no
unjustified sex discrimination under the Standards,55 it is appropriate to pro-
vide suitable prenatal and postnatal care for women prisoners.
56
48. Id. § 23-6.14(d). Accord, DOJ, supra note 11, §§ 11.07-.24; ACA-ACI, supra note 10,
§§ 2-4221--4237. The prohibition against physical or mental deterioration restates a constitu-
tional standard. Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 1759
(1981); Laaman v. Helgemoe, 437 F. Supp. 269, 310 (D. N.H. 1977).
49. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104-05 (1976) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153,
173 (1976)). The right includes emergency treatment, Williams v. Vincent, 508 F.2d 541 (2d
Cir. 1974), and covers physical conditions requiring medical treatment, Cotton v. Hutto, 540
F.2d 412 (8th Cir. 1976); Freeman v. Lockhart, 503 F.2d 1016 (8th Cir. 1974); Robinson v.
Jordan, 494 F.2d 793 (5th Cir. 1974), psychiatric needs, Bowring v. Godwin, 551 F.2d 44 (4th
Cir. 1977); Williams v. Edwards, 547 F.2d 1206, 1217-18 (5th Cir. 1977), and dental care, sd at
1217; Barnes v. Virgin Islands, 415 F. Supp. 1218, 1235 (D.V.I. 1976); Stokes v. Hurdle, 393 F.
Supp. 757 (D. Md. 1975), afJ'dsub noa. Stokes v. Brown, 535 F.2d 1250 (4th Cir. 1976).
50. STANDARDS FOR HEALTH SERVICES IN PRISONS (1979); STANDARDS FOR HEALTH
SERVICES IN JAILS (1979).
51. ACA-ACI, supra note 10, §§ 2-4271--4322.
52. LSOP, supra note 5, § 23-5.1 (a).
53. Id § 23-5.1(b). Institutional hospitals must meet the same standards as licensed gen-
eral hospitals. Id § 23-5.1(c). ACA-ACI, supra note 10, § 2-4284 requires appropriate state or
federal licensure. The discussion to DOJ, supra note 11, § 5.06 notes that requirements of the
United States Public Health Service Commission Corps or the Office of Personnel Management
govern employment in federal institutions. Use of unlicensed, inadequately trained inmates as
sole providers of health care falls below minimum constitutional standards, Ramos v. Lamm,
639 F.2d 559, 576 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 1759 (1981); Williams v. Edwards, 547
F.2d 1206, 1215-18 (5th Cir. 1977), but if qualified professional staff is present there seems to be
no objection under either constitutional principles or the Standards to using inmates as orderlies
and the like, as long as they do not control scheduling of health care appointments or access to
health care services, or have access to surgical instruments, syringes, needles, medications, and
health records. Set DOJ, supra note 11, § 5.37; ACA-ACI, supra note 10, § 2-4288; AMA STAN-
DARDS FOR HEALTH SERVICES IN PRISONS 133 (1979). LSOP, supra note 5, § 23-5.6 prohibits
administration of drugs by inmates under any circumstances.
54. MODEL ACT, supra note 9, § 4-105(c).
55. LSOP, supra note 5, § 23-6.14; see also Glover v. Johnson, 510 F. Supp. 1019 (E.D.
Mich. 1981).
56. LSOP, supra note 5, § 23-5.7(a); see also DOJ, supra note 11, § 5.49. LSOP, supra note 5,
§ 23-5.7(b) contemplates the possibility of nursery facilities in institutions so that inmate
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Adequate health care under the Standards requires that prisoners be
given a comprehensive medical, psychiatric, and dental examination within
a short time after admission to a correctional facility, 57 at regular intervals
thereafter, 58 and upon release from confinement. 59 Maintenance of profes-
sionally adequate health records also is indispensable to proper health pro-
tection. The Standards contemplate records compiled according to accepted
medical standards, maintained in a confidential and secure manner during
confinement and for a recommended five-year period following discharge.
60
Prisoners possess the same rights to accept or reject health care as do
citizens generally. Therefore, the Standards6 1 recognize that prisoners may
decline either examination or treatment unless (a) it is required by court
order,62 (b) a responsible physician reasonably believes it necessary to detect
or treat communicable diseases or otherwise to protect the health of other
persons, 63 or (c) the condition is emergent and treatment is necessary to pre-
mothers may keep their children for at least a reasonable time pending longer-range custodial
arrangements. Other standards, e.g., DOJ, supra note 1I, § 5.49; ACA-ACI, supra note 10, § 2-
4333, go no further than to recommend prenatal counseling concerning child placement; DOJ,
supra note 11, § 5.49 recommends arrangements for childbirth off institutional premises. There
is no right, apparently, to insist on retaining infants for a time within an institution. Wain-
wright v. Moore, 374 So. 2d 586 (Fla. App. 1979) (interpreting statute). It may be that women
prisoners cannot be required to give up their children without valid supporting reasons other
than incarceration. Apgar v. Beauter, 75 Misc. 2d 439, 347 N.Y.S.2d 872 (Sup. Ct. 1973) (inter-
preting statute).
57. LSOP, supra note 5, § 23-5.3(a), (b)(i) (recommended within two weeks after admis-
sion); see also DOJ, supra note 11, §§ 5.15-.16; ACA-ACI, supra note 10, §§ 2-4290-4291. Pre-
conviction detainees also should be given a thorough physical and dental examination upon
personal request if confinement will last more than two weeks. LSOP, supra note 5, § 23-5.3(c).
58. LSOP, supra note 5, § 23-5.3(b)(ii) (recommended maximum interval of two years). See
also DOJ, supra note 1I, § 5.45; ACA-ACI, supra note 10, § 2-4302 (discussion recommends
annual examinations for inmates over 50, and biennial examinations for those younger than 50).
There must of course be independent medical care and diagnosis available at any time, and
regular daily sick calls to meet prisoner needs, a matter independent of routine medical exami-
nations. LSOP, supra note 5, §§ 23-5. 1(a), -5.2. If care and, presumably, adequate diagnosis
cannot be provided within a prison facility or system, a prisoner patient must be transferred to a
civil health facility with the needed facilities. Id § 23-5.1(a). Under no circumstances can cor-
rectional personnel impede or unreasonably delay a prisoner's access to medical care. Id § 23-
5.2.
59. LSOP, supra note 5, § 23-5.3(b)(iii) (if the most recent examination was more than a
year before), a practice recommended in the discussion to ACA-ACI, supra note 10, § 2-4302.
60. LSOP, supra note 5, § 23-5.4; see also DOJ, supra note 11, §§ 5.38-41; ACA-ACI, supra
note 10, §§ 2-4318--4321. Confidentiality of records generally is dealt with in LSOP, supra note
5, § 23-6.11; see text accompanying notes 188-93 thfta.
61. LSOP, supra note 5, § 23-5.5; see also DOJ, supra note 11, § 5.51; ACA-ACI, supra note
10, § 2-4313.
62. Prison administrators were held to be empowered to compel dialysis treatment for a
prisoner whose refusal to undergo treatment was a protest to gain a transfer to a minimum
security institution. Commissioner of Correction v. Myers, 399 N.E.2d 452 (Mass. 1979).
Otherwise, there is probably no constitutional claim to order treatment for adults because they
would be better off for it. Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass.
728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977); Lang v. City of Des Moines, 294 N.W.2d 557 (Iowa 1980) (cannot
force treatment for alcoholism during jail incarceration).
63. Healthy prisoners' constitutional rights are infringed if reasonable steps are not taken
to safeguard them against communicable diseases of other inmates. Freeman v. Lockhart, 503
F.2d 1016 (8th Cir. 1974) (double-ceiling with known tubercular inmate); Lareau v. Manson,
507 F. Supp. 1177 (D. Conn. 1980) (failure to screen incoming jail inmates for communicable
diseases); Hines v. Anderson, 439 F. Supp. 12, 23 (D. Minn. 1977) (inmates with contagious
diseases to be segregated).
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vent permanent and serious injury to the inmate-patient's health. A corol-
lary to this is that inmates should not be made the subjects of nontherapeutic
experimentation of any kind, even though ostensibly with informed, volun-
tary prisoner consent. 64 The Standards, however, recognize the existence of a
somewhat more difficult problem if experimental therapeutic treatments are
used with prisoners.6 5 Presumably, private citizens can agree to participate
for a fee or otherwise in any sort of experiment that is not immediately life-
endangering and that otherwise is acceptable within medical and goven-
mental guidelines. Prisoners, in contrast, are not allowed to agree to partici-
pate in nontherapeutic experiments because of a doubt that anyone confined
or otherwise subjected to substantial governmental controls is free from in-
ducements, subtle or otherwise, to consent. Under the Standards, however,
prisoners can agree to participate in a therapeutic medical program not in
general civilian use, as long as it has been approved as medically sound and
in conformance with generally accepted medical standards,66 and is based
on voluntary and informed written consent. 6 7 Under such an approach,
prisoners can consent to individualized treatment even though the treatment
regimen is at the time in a somewhat preliminary or experimental phase and
thus not routinely available to the general population. It must be stressed,
however, that no apparently healthy prisoner can be allowed under the Stan-
dards to volunteer as a control.
Pharmaceuticals must be under strict control and supervision both to
see that they are appropriately administered as medical treatment and to
forestall illicit access. This is stressed in the Standards6 8 as in counterpart
statements of principle. 69 Ultimate responsibility for pharmaceuticals must
lie with a physician in charge of institutional medical care, and only medical
care staff should dispense prescription medications except in an emergency
when custodial personnel may administer them at the direction of medically
trained staff.
7 0
64. LSOP, supra note 5, § 23-5.8(a); DOJ, supra note 11, § 5.50; ACA-ACI, supra note 10,
§ 2-4314.
65. LSOP, supra note 5, 23-5.8(b)-(e); a substantially similar position is taken in DOJ, supra
note 11, § 5.51 and Canadian Correctional Service, Guidelines Covering the Professional Con-
duct of Health Professionals in the CCS $ 25 (mimeo, current but undated).
66. LSOP, supra note 5, § 23-5.8(b) (i), (c) (based on review by a committee established by
law to evaluate the program's medical validity). This procedure is required under federal regu-
lations as well. 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.301-.306 (1980).
67. LSOP, supra note 5, § 23-5.8(d). Informed consent requires advance information of (a)
the likely effects, including possible side effects, of a procedure; (b) the likelihood and degree of
improvement, remission, control, or cure resulting from a procedure; (c) any uncertainty as to
benefits or hazards of a procedure; (d) existing reasonable alternatives to a procedure; and (e)
an ability on a prisoner's part to withdraw from a procedure or regimen at any time. Id. § 23-
5.8(e). Written consents should be reviewed by an independent committee including prisoners
and ex-offenders which interviews a participating prisoner personally, id, § 23-5.8(d); specific
judicial approval following an adversary hearing is required in instances of psychosurgery, elec-
trical stimulation of the brain or adversive conditioning. Id § 23-5.8(b)(iii).
68. LSOP, supra note 5, § 23-5.6.
69. Accreditation and inspection standards are in much greater detail than LSOP. DOJ,
supra note 11, §§ 5.34-.37; ACA-ACI, supra note 10, § 2-4317. ACA-ACI, supra note 10, §§ 2-
4306-4307 provide for detoxification programs for chemically dependent inmates.
70. LSOP, supra note 5, § 23-5.6 also contains a flat prohibition against administration of




Prison inmates do not lose their rights as citizens to hold whatever reli-
gious beliefs they wish. 7 This constitutional right is restated in the Stan-
dard r. 72 Difficulties arise in and out of prison, however, over the extent to
which the practice or exercise of religion can be regulated or subjected to
sanctions. Certainly, the free exercise clause of the first amendment 73 pro-
hibits loss of livelihood based on practice of religious beliefs; 74 the basic issue
in prisons is the extent to which a penal environment requires restrictions on
religious practices, as opposed to beliefs, not valid in the free community.
The position of the Standards is that any religious practice may be engaged in
if consistent with orderly confinement and institutional security.
75
Although one may question the logic of the position, courts have ruled
that the first amendment establishment clause 76 is not violated through ap-
pointment of chaplains and religious counselors in prisons at public ex-
pense, 77 a principle which presumably extends to chapels, religious
furnishings and other amenities. Nevertheless, the first amendment coupled
with fourteenth amendment equal protection requires that there be no dis-
crimination among religious groups, a principle restated in the Standards.
78
As long as new religions were relatively rare phenomena in society they
posed no special difficulties for prison administration. During the past gen-
eration, however, American correctional officials have been confronted by
religious groups, formal recognition of which they resisted until forced to
comply by the federal courts. Landmark decisions flowed from efforts by
adherents of the Black Muslim (now World Community of Islam) movement
to gain freedom of worship, diet, and dress in prisons; the status of that
group as a recognized religion is clearly established today. 79 More recently,
71. Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 (1972); Cooper v. Pate, 378 U.S. 546 (1964).
72. LSOP, supra note 5, § 23-6.5(a), and see id § 23-1.1 and text accompanying note 13
supra. See also DOJ, supra note 11, § 1.08; ACA-ACI, supra note 10, § 2-4336.
73. "Congress shall make no law . . . prohibiting the free exercise [of religion]." U.S.
CONST. amend. I.
74. Thomas v. Review Bd., 101 S. Ct. 1425 (1981) (free exercise infringement when Jeho-
vah's Witness was denied unemployment compensation after quitting because of an involuntary
transfer to a foundry department producing tank turrets, and all other departments within the
company also were engaged in weapons production); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963)
(unemployment benefits could not be denied a worker discharged because she would not work
on the sabbath); ef Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961) (Sunday closing laws could be
invoked against those whose religious beliefs required them to refrain from work on Saturday
and who wanted to engage in business on Sundays in compensation). See also Frank v. State,
604 P.2d 1068 (Alaska 1979) (Athabascan Indian could not be convicted of violating game laws
for killing moose out of season for use in religious potlatch ceremony).
75. LSOP, supra note 5, § 23-6.5(b). This restates the general principle of § 23-1.1; see text
accompanying note 13 sra.
76. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion." U.S. CONST.
amend. I.
77. Theriault v. Silber, 547 F.2d 1279 (5th Cir. 1977); see also Gittlemacker v. Prasse, 428
F.2d 1, 4 (3d Cir. 1970).
78. LSOP, supra note 5, §§ 23-6.5(h) (resources and facilities should be equitably allocated
according to the proportion of prisoners adhering to each faith), -6.15 (no discriminatory treat-
ment based solely on religion).
79. See, e.g., Mukmuk v. Commissioner of Dep't of Correctional Services, 529 F.2d 272 (2d
Cir.), cert. drned, 426 U.S. 911 (1976); Muhammad-D.C.C. v. Keve, 479 F. Supp. 1311 (D. Del.
1979); Bryant v. McGinnis, 463 F. Supp. 373 (W.D. N.Y. 1978).
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a prison-generated religion, the Church of the New Song (CONS), has gen-
erated substantial litigation. What seemingly began as a frivolous effort to
harass prison officials has gathered adherents both in and out of prisons and
therefore has gained a limited measure of recognition.8 0 Other religious
groups involved in current legal controversies include a Christian-oriented
homosexual entity, the Universal Fellowship of Metropolitan Community
Churches,8 the Native American Church,82 and even satanism.83 The
Supreme Court is not generally receptive toward elaborate tests in light of
which bona fide religious belief or status is to be ascertained. 84 Thus, ac-
creditation standards have ceased essaying judgmental criteria for prison ad-
ministrators.8 5 For similar reasons, the ABA Standards eschew a black-letter
definition of religion.
8 6
Consistent with constitutional precedent, the Standards provide that
prisoners should be allowed diets of nutritious food consonant with their reli-
gious beliefs and opportunities to observe special religious rites, including
fasting and special dining hours 3n major holidays generally observed within
their religion, subject to the usual concerns of institutional order and secur-
ity.87 Prisoners should also be allowed freedom to use of modes of dress or
appearance, including religious medals and other symbols, as long as these
do not interfere with identification and prisoner security. 88
80. Remmers v. Brewer, 529 F.2d 656 (8th Cir. 1976); Theriault v. Carlson, 495 F.2d 390
(5th Cir. 1974); but ste Church of the New Song v. Establishment of Religion on Taxpayers'
Money in the Federal Bureau of Prisons, 620 F.2d 648 (7th Cir. 1980) (res judicata applied to
district court ruling in another circuit that CONS is not a bona fide religion).
81. Lipp v. Procunier, 395 F. Supp. 871 (N.D. Cal. 1975).
82. Battle v. Anderson, 457 F. Supp. 719, 733-34 (E.D. Okla. 1978) (holding not affected
by subsequent appeals on procedural matters).
83. Kennedy v. Meacham, 540 F.2d 1057 (10th Cir. 1976) (district court should not have
dismissed satanist prisoner's claims on pleadings; factual hearings required).
84. In Thomas v. Review Bd., 101 S. Ct. 1425, 1430 (1981), the Court noted that "determi-
nation of what is a 'religious' belief or practice is more often than not a difficult and delicate
task"; "[clourts should not undertake to dissect religious beliefs because the believer admits that
he is 'struggling' with his position or because his beliefs are not articulated with the clarity and
precision that a more sophisticated person might employ."
85. The first edition of ACA-ACI,supra note 10, § 4304 (discussion) and ACA-ALDF,supra
note 10, § 5278 (discussion) admonished that "the number of persons who practice the religion,
the newness of the religion or the absence from the religion of a concept of Supreme Being
should be irrelevant in determining what constitutes legitimate religious practices." Se also
NAC CORRECTIONS, supra note 8, § 2.16. The current ACA-ACI, supra note 10, § 2-4462 dis-
cussion states only that "it is the responsibility of the institution to ensure that all inmates are
able to voluntarily exercise their constitutional right to religious freedom when this freedom
does not interfere with the order and security of the institution," the substantial equivalent to
LSOP § 23-6.5(b). The discussion to DOJ, supra note 11, § 15.01 continues a standard that "[a]
presumption of legitimacy attaches to newly formed religions, but the presumption may be
rebutted by conduct which demonstrates that the religion is not authentic or that the religious
group is not acting in good faith."
86. The Standing Committee thought it unnecessary to continue an admonition in the first
tentative draft, LSOP (Tent. Draft No. 1), supra note 4, at 508, § 6.3(g), that such issues should
be resolved by competent courts, not correctional authorities.
87. LSOP, supra note 5, § 23-6.5(c). Less direct reference to "facilities" and "symbols" is
found in DOJ, supra note 11, § 15.01; ACA-ACI, supra note 10, § 2-4468 uses the formulation of
"opportunities to adhere to the requirements of [prisoners'] . . . respective faiths." Representa-
tive constitutional precedent includes Kahane v. Carlson, 527 F.2d 492 (2d Cir. 1975); Aziz v.
Le Fevre, 500 F. Supp. 725 (N.D. N.Y. 1980); Schlesinger v. Carlson, 489 F. Supp. 612 (M.D.
Pa. 1980); Finney v. Mabry, 458 F. Supp. 720 (E.D. Ark. 1978).
88. LSOP, supra note 5, § 23-6.5(f); freedom of personal grooming generally also is stated
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A corollary to freedom to engage in personal religious practices is free-
dom from pressure to participate in religious activities.8 9 A greater problem
in practice flows from routine solicitation and preservation of information
about religious affiliation in prisoner files, because of its importance to ad-
ministrative matters like issuance of passes to participate in scheduled reli-
gious activities, eligibility for special diets, and approval of requests for
special visits by religious counselors. Maintaining such records throughout a
period of incarceration does not violate the first amendment as long as pris-
oners have an avenue to change religious affiliation on the basis of whatever
showing is reasonably required by correctional authorities. 9° However, ac-
tive consideration by classification committees or paroling authorities of re-
corded participation in religious activities might well amount to a subtle yet
substantial pressure to adhere, or to appear to adhere, to orthodox religious
beliefs and practices. Hence, the ABA position is that only "directory" infor-
mation, i.e., an initial or amended indication of religious affiliation necessary
to administrative activity, is to be retained concerning prisoner religious
activities. 91
The Standards embody the premise that all prisoners, even those under
disciplinary and other special management, should have access to religious
counseling, which appears to be a constitutional right.9 2 Conversations with
religious counselors, intended to be confidential, fall within a provision else-
where in LSOP urging creation of an evidentiary privilege for all counselors
covering information other than that about a contemplated crime, unless
disclosure is required by court order.
93
F. Labor, Education, and Habih'iation
A history of exploitation of convict labor during the nineteenth century
and antipathy on the part of the burgeoning labor union movement toward
uncompensated or minimally compensated prison labor, generated almost
universal state statutory prohibitions against prison enterprises not related
in § 23-6.8, subject to the general concerns of § 23-1.1. Constitutional decisions on the matter
include St. Claire v. Cuyler, 634 F.2d 109 (3d Cir. 1980) (restrictions sustained as reasonable);
Burgin v, Henderson, 536 F.2d 501 (2d Cir. 1976); Teterud v. Burns, 522 F.2d 357 (8th Cir.
1975); Wright v. Raines, 457 F. Supp. 1082 (D. Kan. 1978); Maguire v. Wilkinson, 405 F. Supp.
637 (D. Conn. 1975).
89. LSOP, supra note 5, § 23-6.5(d); see also DOJ, supra note 11, § 1.08; ACA-ACI, supra
note 10, § 2-4334. Prisoners cannot consttutionally be exposed to proselyting activities or be
forced to attend religious services against their personal desire. Campbell v. Cauthron, 623 F.2d
503 (8th Cir. 1980); cf. Aziz v. LeFevre, 500 F. Supp. 725 (N.D. N.Y. 1980) (not improper to ban
organized religious activities in exercise area used by other prisoners).
90. An absolute refusal to allow notation of a change in affiliation might well violate the
first amendment. Smith v. Blackledge, 451 F.2d 1201 (4th Cir. 1971). Individuals may be
required to establish a bona fide belief in a religion, Ron v. Lennane, 445 F. Supp. 98 (D. Conn.
1977), subject to Supreme Court criteria laid down, e.g., in Thomas v. Review Bd., 101 S. Ct.
1425 (1981); see note 84 supra.
91. LSOP, supra note 5, § 23-6.5(e).
92. Id § 23-6.5(g). See also DOJ, supra note 11, §§ 15.01-.02; ACA-ACI, supra note 10,
§§ 2-4465, -4469. See, e.g., Sweet v. South Carolina Dept. of Corrections, 529 F.2d 854, 863-64
(4th Cir. 1975); LaReau v. MacDougall, 473 F.2d 974 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 878
(1973); Sharp v. Sigler, 408 F.2d 966 (8th Cir. 1969); McBride v. McCorkle, 44 N.J. Super. 468,
130 A.2d 881 (1957).
93. LSOP, supra note 5, § 23-6.11 (c).
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directly to institutional maintenance (including production of foodstuffs) or
to requirements of governmental agencies. Federal law today prevents state
prison labor products from being shipped in interstate commerce.94 This
legislation swiftly eradicated the abuses which engendered it, but also pro-
duced questionable consequences: public needs could not justify full em-
ployment for large prison populations; to a constantly increasing extent, the
skills (if any) acquired in prison industries had few applications to civilian
industry, particularly when budgetary restraints precluded acquisition of
"state of the art" machinery and equipment; and artificial pricing of goods
for governmental and institutional use constituted a constant drain on cor-
rectional budgets to the detriment of habilitation programs viewed by penal
administrators as more beneficial than prison industrial programs. These
problems have been overcome through work-release and work-study pro-
grams sponsored by local or regional industries, though only to a limited
extent, since they benefit only a relatively small number of younger
prisoners.
Another significant factor has been a decline in the prestige of the reha-
bilitative principle. Prisons are increasingly thought of as places for punitive
treatment designed to deter and for segregation from society through a fixed
term. Consequently, prisoners should not be forced to participate in pro-
grams which will improve them, but only in activities relating to cleanliness
and order, food service, maintenance, and production of goods for public
use. 95 Nevertheless, whether habilitated or deterred, almost all prisoners re-
turn to communities where they must support themselves as an alternative to
recidivating. There is increasing advocacy, therefore, of a reintroduction of
private industry in prisons under conditions appropriate to forestall exploita-
tion of prison labor for private gain. 96 It was against that background that
the first tentative draft of the Standards97 and, to a somewhat lesser extent,
the fourth tentative draft98 urged the aspirational goal that prisoners should
have access to fully remunerative employment and receive substantially the
same workers' benefits as their counterparts in free society. But prisoners
should be required as well to pay costs and contributions like those to which
94. 18 U.S.C. § 1761(a) (1976); Kentucky Whip & Collar Co. v. Illinois Central R. Co.,
299 U.S. 334 (1937); Wentworth v. Solem, 548 F.2d 773 (8th Cir. 1977). Federal prison indus-
tries are authorized by 18 U.S.C. §§ 4121-4128 (1976). See generally NAC CORRECTIONS, supra
note 8, § 16.13; G. HAWKINS, THE PRISON, ch. 5 (1976); S. RUBIN, THE LAW OF CRIMINAL
CORRECTION, 325-27 (2d ed. 1973).
95. LSOP, rupra note 5, § 23-4.1; DOJ, supra note 11, § 1.10; cf ACA-ACI, supra note 10,
§ 2-4334 (inmates must accept work assignments, enrollment in basic education programs, med-
ical and dental care mandated by statute, and participation in other programs ordered by the
sentencing court or required by statute).
96. Congress in 1976 added a new subsection (c) to 18 U.S.C. § 1761, see note 94 supra,
allowing the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) to conduct up to seven pilot
projects in which prisoners could receive full pay for industrial work, subject to a liability for
deductions up to 80 percent of gross pay for deductions including federal and state taxes and
fringe benefits, as well as a contribution of between 5 and 20 percent to a victim compensation
fund. As of August 1981, LEAA had funded programs in Arizona, Kansas, and Minnesota.
The remaining four projects are expected to be authorized by November 1981. Letter to author
from George H. Bollinger, III, Acting Administrator, LEAA (August 26, 1981).
97. LSOP (rent. Draft No. 1), upra note 4, at 458-65, §§ 4.1-.4 and commentary.
98. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, LEGAL STATUS OF PRISONERS §§ 23-4.2-.5
(Tent. Draft, No. 4, 1980).
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free world workers are subject, including a reasonable sum to a corrections
system to meet the costs of maintaining them. Because of substantial opposi-
tion to such a concept in the ABA House of Delegates, however, those sec-
tions and a counterpart section governing compensation for injuries or
death 99 were withdrawn by the Standing Committee from House considera-
tion and consequently do not form a part of the Standards as ultimately
approved.
To recapitulate, the position of the Standards is that prisoners may be
compelled to keep their quarters clean and to participate in other activities
essential to institutional security and order, including cleaning, sanitation,
food service, maintenance, and prison industries producing goods for govern-
ment use.' 0 0 Prisoners should expect no compensation for maintaining the
cleanliness and orderliness of personal living quarters, t' but should be given
compensation for other work, properly performed, adequate to permit com-
missary purchases and to allow accumulation of limited funds toward re-
lease. 0 2 If prisoners want to participate in other programs and activities,
including those which can contribute to self-improvement and education,
they can and should be encouraged to do so, but are not to be compelled.
10 3
Although there is no specific mention of compensation for death or injury in
the ultimate version of the Standards, prisoners have a claim to a healthful
place in which to live10 4 and to institutional compliance with industrial
safety codes applicable to counterpart facilities in the free world. ' 0 5 Even if
the Standards were silent on the matter, the constitutional case law is clear




100. LSOP, supra note 5, § 23-4.1. Pretrial detainees should not be required to engage in
programs or activities not related to institutional security and order. Id § 23-4. 1 (a).
101. Id § 23-4.1(a).
102. Id § 23-4. 1(b). Federal courts will not intervene to eliminate wage differentials among
classes of prisoners. MeCray v. Fauver, 28 CRIM. L. REP. (BNA) 2484 (D. N.J. 1981).
103. LSOP, supra note 5, § 23-4.2. Prisons are not bound under equal protection to provide
work release programs in all institutions of the same category. Jamieson v. Robinson, 641 F.2d
138 (3d Cir. 1981). The MODEL ACT, supra note 9, §§ 4-701-706, recommends a voucher
system under which prisoners may apply for or otherwise earn voucher credits to be used solely
for the "purchase" of rehabilitation services. Some state prison systems also use a parole or
performance contract plan under which prison residents can enter into agreements guarantee-
ing release by a fixed date if the contracting residents conform to all contract terms and attain
all contract objectives which almost always are treatment oriented. Set, e.g., id. § 4-701 com-
mentary; MICH. ADMIN. CODE R. 791.7725 (1977).
104. LSOP, supra note 5, § 23-6.9. See also Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559, 568 (10th Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 1759 (1981).
105. LSOP, supra note 5, § 23-6.14(a)(i).
106. E.g., Haworth v. State, 60 Haw. 557, 592 P.2d 820 (1979); Green v. State Corrections
Dep't, 386 Mich. 459, 192 N.W.2d 491 (1971); Reid v. New York State Dep't of Correctional
Servs., 54 App. Div. 2d 83, 387 N.Y.S.2d 589 (1976). Federal prisoners have a claim to compen-
sation under 18 U.S.C. § 4126 (1976); 28 C.F.R. §§ 301.1-.16 (1980); Sturgeon v. Federal Prison
Indus., 608 F.2d 1153 (8th Cir. 1979) (prisoners first must exhaust administrative remedies, and
Federal Tort Claims Act relief is not an alternate remedy); Berry v. Federal Prison Indus., 440
F. Supp. 1147 (N.D. Cal. 1977). Some states bring prisoners within a workers' compensation
system. Meredith v. California Workers Compensation Appeals Bd., 19 Cal. 3d 777, 567 P.2d
746, 140 Cal. Rptr. 314, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1064 (1977). Prisoners may be dismissed from
industrial assignments because of failure to comply with applicable rules. McMath v. Alexan-
der, 486 F. Supp. 156 (M.D. Tenn. 1980).
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G. External Contacts
Communications to which prisoners are parties merit broad first
amendment protection, in part because free members of society also are in-
volved. 107 Therefore, as the Standards restate, limitations on prisoners' com-
munication rights should be the least restrictive necessary to serve the
legitimate interests of institutional order and security and protection of the
public.108 Prisoner communications tend to fall within certain clearly de-
fined categories.
1. Courts
Prisoners, like citizens generally, must have untrammeled access to
courts on all matters, criminal and civil. 10 9 Correctional authorities, there-
fore, are under a duty not only not to impede prisoner efforts to bring mat-
ters before the courts, but also to take reasonable steps to facilitate prisoner
access to the judicial process. Thus, for example, prisoner work schedules
cannot be set so that it is difficult or impossible for inmates to prepare
needed documents or to engage in legal research."10 Subject to reasonable
regulations based on institutional safety and security, prisoners should be
allowed to keep legal documents and materials in their cells."' Authorities
also ought to see that prisoners have access to reasonable amounts of supplies
in connection with litigation." 2 These judicially delineated rights are re-
stated and to some extent elaborated upon in the Standards.'
13
The primary principle is that governmental authorities have a responsi-
bility to assure free and meaningful access to the judicial process. Access
must be without regard to whether an otherwise judicially cognizable issue
relates to the legality of conviction or confinement, asserts legal rights
against correctional or other governmental authorities, relates to civil legal
problems, or amounts to a defense against prosecutions or actions in which
107. Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 413-14 (1974).
108. LSOP, supra note 5, § 23-6. 1(a). Constitutional doctrine seemingly allows restrictions
on correspondence with other prisoners because no free citizen is affected by prison controls.
Heft v. Carlson, 489 F.2d 268 (5th Cir. 1973); Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178, 199 (2d Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1049, 405 U.S. 978 (1972); Thomas v. State, 285 Md. 458, 404 A.2d
257 (1979) (interprison mail can be examined and incriminating contents preserved as evi-
dence). Prison authorities perhaps may establish lists of authorized correspondents for each
prisoner. Finney v. Arkansas Bd. of Correction, 505 F.2d 194, 210-12 (8th Cir. 1974). However,
for such concepts to be invoked under LSOP § 23-6. 1(a), a showing would be required that no
less restrictive conditions are adequate to forestall an identified threat to institutional order and
security.
109. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977); Erparte Hull, 312 U.S. 546 (1941); Ramos v.
Lamm, 639 F.2d 559 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 1759 (1981).
110. Gittlemacker v. Prasse, 428 F.2d 1 (3d Cir. 1970); DeWitt v. Pail, 366 F.2d 682 (9th
Cir. 1966); Jordan v. Johnson, 381 F. Supp. 600 (E.D. Mich. 1974), ajd, 513 F.2d 631 (6th Cir.
1975).
111. Oxendine v. Williams, 509 F.2d 1405 (4th Cir. 1975). Cf Mahler v. Slattery, 489 F.
Supp. 798 (E.D. Va. 1980) (prisoner engaged in 62 pendingpro se cases had no right to keep 23
cartons of case files in his cell).
112. Access to a typewriter is not a constitutional right, however, because pro se prisoners are
allowed to file handwritten petitions. Ramos v. Lamm, 485 F. Supp. 122, 166 (D. Colo. 1979),
modiftedon other grounds, 629 F.2d 559 (10th Cir. 1980), cet. denied, 101 S. Ct. 1759 (1981).
113 LSOP, supra note 5, § 23-2.1. See atso DOJ, supra note 11, §§ 1.03, 12.07; ACA-ACI,
supra note 10, §§ 2-4022, -4323, -4378.
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prisoners are respondents." 14 As a corollary to this principle, prison authori-
ties cannot read, censor, or alter prisoner legal documents,"1 5 and cannot use
a prisoner's decision to seek judicial relief to affect adversely program status
within a correctional institution or opportunity for release. 116 Moreover,
correctional authorities should allow prisoners a reasonable amount of free
stationery and postage to communicate with courts," 1 7 and cannot intercept
any communication reasonably anticipated to be directed to a court unless
under court order or otherwise authorized by law. " 8 If written communica-
tions to courts are not effective under the circumstances, free telephone con-
tact with court officials should be permitted. 119 Prisoners should be allowed
to prepare and retain legal documents subject only to reasonable regulations,
dictated by considerations of institutional safety and scheduling, bearing on
time, place and manner of preparation and circumstances of retention. The
principle of least restrictive alternative is specifically advanced in this
setting. 120
The Poslconviction Remedies Standards '2 ' urge a single and comprehensive
remedial procedure which should have priority over other matters. 122 This
is supported in LSOP, which calls for prompt resolution of disputes involv-
ing legality, duration, or conditions of confinement.'
2 3
2. Public Officials
The right to petition government officials for redress of grievances is a
first amendment right.' 2 4 It is restated and implemented in the Standards
114. LSOP, supra note 5, § 23-2.1(a), (b)(i).
115. Id § 23-2.1(b)(v). See also Expart Hull, 312 U.S. 546 (1941); Guajardo v. Estelle, 580
F.2d 748, 757 (5th Cir. 1978).
116. LSOP,tepra note 5, § 23-2.1(b)(vi). On unconstitutionality of discipline based on seek-
ing judicial relief, see Leonardo v. Moran, 611 F.2d 397 (lst Cir. 1979) (but not established on
facts); Mawhinney v. Henderson, 542 F.2d I (2d Cir. 1976); United States ex rel. Cleggett v.
Pate, 229 F. Supp. 818 (N.D. Ill. 1964) (solitary confinement for seeking legal redress of griev-
ances declared invalid). On other administrative sanctions against prisoner litigators, see, e.g.,
Hines v. Askew, 514 F.2d 673 (5th Cir. 1975) (allegations that prison authorities transferred a
prisoner and withheld medicine from him because he filed a Federal Civil Rights Act claim
stated a cause of action); Wren v. Carlson, 506 F.2d 131 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (prisoner subjected to
harassment); Corby v. Conboy, 457 F.2d 251 (2d Cir. 1972); Smartt v. Avery, 370 F.2d 788 (6th
Cir. 1967) (parole board regulations delaying consideration of parole if person engaged in litiga-
tion declared invalid).
117. LSOP, supra note 5, § 23-6.1(e). See Wickham v. Fisher, 629 P.2d 896 (Ut. 1981).
118. LSOP, supra note 5, § 23-6.1 (d) (ii).
119. Id §23-6.1(0.
120. Id §§ 23-2.1(b) (iv), 2.3(b); cf ACA-ACI,supra note 10, § 2-4230 (access to legal materi-
als by inmates in segregation).
121. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 1, ch. 22.
122. Id §§ 22-1.1, -4.4.
123. LSOP, supra note 4, § 23-2. 1(b)(ii). The standard recommends that administrative
processes are presumptively unreasonable if not completed within 30 working days. It endorses
the doctrine of exhaustion of remedies unless past practice or other facts demonstrate the futility
of an available process.
124. Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559, 582 (10th Cir. 1980),cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 1759 (1981);
Taylor v. Sterrett, 532 F.2d 462, 480-81 (5th Cir. 1976) (inspection for contraband, but no
censorship of mail to and from officials); LeVier v. Woodson, 443 F.2d 360 (10th Cir. 1971)
(refusal to transmit mail to public officials, if established, would violate Federal Civil Rights
Act). In Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 130 n.6 (1977), the
Court noted that inmates were not prevented from communicating grievances to correctional
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through a prohibition against interception of communications to officials of
the confining authority, state and local chief executive officers, and legisla-
tors and administrators of grievance systems.' 25 The Standards confirm the




The sixth amendment right to counsel in criminal and quasi-criminal
cases' 2 7 carries with it the right of access to counsel during confinement so
that counsel may prepare for a constitutionally competent presentation of a
prisoner-client's case. Consequently, visual monitoring of attorney-client
conferences has been held to be an unreasonable interference with confiden-
tial attorney-client communications protected by the sixth amendment.
128
The contents of communications to and from counsel cannot be read but can
be visually inspected for presence of contraband.1 29 It is proper, however, to
require attorneys to confirm beforehand to prison authorities the existence of
an attorney-client relationship and to identify specific communications as
coming from them.13 0 Prison authorities are prohibited from defining prov-
iders of legal assistance by, for example, refusing to allow law student interns
or legal assistants employed by lawyers to interview prisoners in connection
with litigation. 131
Under the Standards, prisoners have the same liberty to retain and con-
sult private counsel on all legal matters as private citizens do. '3 2 Correspon-
dence and other communications between attorneys and prisoner-clients are
authorities: "With this presumably effective path available for the transmission of grievances,
the fact that the Union's grievance procedures might be more 'desirable' does not convert the
prohibitory regulations into unconstitutional acts."
125. LSOP, supra note 5, § 23-6. 1(d) (ii). Reasonable amounts of stationery and free postage
should be available for the purpose. Id § 23-6.1 (e). Visits with public officials should not be
counted against visiting periods and should be unlimited except as to time and duration. Id
§ 23-6.2(e). See also DOJ, supra note 11, § 12.07; ACA-ACI, supra note 10, § 2-4378.
126. LSOP, supra note 5, § 23-6.6(b), but prisoners cannot practice intimidation against
other prisoners or persons in the process. This does not extend to a right to strike or take other
concerted action to affect institutional conditions, programs, or policies, id § 23-6.6(c), which
conforms to current Supreme Court doctrine. Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union,
Inc., 433 U.S. 119 (1977).
127. Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972);
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); scope of the right on appeal is covered by Ross v.
Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 (1974).
128. Case v. Andrews, 226 Kan. 786, 603 P.2d 623 (1979). Cf State ex rel. McCamic v.
McCoy, 276 S.E.2d 534 (W. Va. 1981) (pat-down search of lawyers improper unless institution
could show factual basis indicating attorneys create a security danger).
129. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 576-77 (1974); Henry v. Perrin, 609 F.2d 1010 (lst
Cir. 1979), cert. dened, 445 U.S. 963 (1980); Wycoff v. Brewer, 572 F.2d 1260 (8th Cir. 1978);
Crowe v. Leeke, 550 F.2d 184 (4th Cir. 1977).
130. Guajardo v. Estelle, 580 F.2d 748 (5th Cir. 1978).
131. Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974). Cf Perkins v. Wagner, 513 F. Supp. 904
(E.D. Pa. 1981) (authorities had to allow visits with codefendant wife as long as necessary to
establish a coordinated and adequate defense, subject to appropriate institutional security
arrangements).
132. LSOP, supra note 5, § 23-2.2(c). For the scope of assistance to prisoners in the context
of administrative and other hearings within the correctional system, see text accompanying
notes 277-78, 291-92 inca.
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subject to interception only pursuant to court order or as otherwise author-
ized by law.' 3 3 Visits with attorneys should be free from limitations other
than as to time and duration and should not count against established visit-
ing periods for family and friends. '
3 4
A troubling issue has been provision by inmates of assistance to other
prisoners in the preparation of legal documents. The potential in such a
practice for exploitation of some prisoners by others is evident. Nevertheless,
the Supreme Court has held that if prison administrators do not make avail-
able or facilitate access to more professionally qualified sources of legal assist-
ance, they cannot punish or otherwise interfere unreasonably with inmates
who provide uncompensated assistance in legal matters.'
3 5
Access to adequate legal materials relates to representation by counsel
in that, as a constitutional matter, if competent legal assistance is not made
available to prisoners, prisons must provide them with basic legal research
materials. ' 3 6 The Standards take a "both-and" position on the matter. Cor-
rectional authorities should make educational services available even to pris-
oners who have access to legal services, either through special printed
materials or through a collection of standard legal reference materials bear-
ing on criminal law and procedure and cognate constitutional issues.
137
4. Correspondence Generally
Because communications rights of nonprisoners are affected directly,
the Supreme Court has ruled that censorship or other controls on correspon-
dence cannot be exercised unless prison officials meet a burden of showing
that their impositions advance "one or more of the substantial governmental
interests of security, order, and rehabilitation" and are no broader or stricter
than required for the purpose.' 38 Under that constitutional standard, as in-
dicated earlier, correspondence with legal counsel cannot be read but can
133. LSOP, supra note 5, § 23-6.1 (d)(i). Indigent prisoners should be allowed reasonable
amounts of stationery and postage for the purpose, id § 23-6.1 (e), and access to free telephone
services for calls to attorneys in connection with current litigation if correctional authorities
determine that written communications are ineffective under the circumstances. d § 23-6.1 (l).
See also DOJ, supra note 11, § 12.07; ACA-ACI, supra note 10, §§ 2-4338, -4378.
134. LSOP, supra note 5, § 23-6.2(e). See Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559 (10th Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 1759 (1981); State cx re. McCamic v. McCoy, 276 S.E.2d 534 (W. Va.
1981), both eliminating restrictions on time and duration of counsel interviews. Cobb v. Aytch,
643 F.2d 946 (3d Cir. 1981), held that preconviction detainees subject to transfer to a distant
state penitentiary where they could not readily contact counsel and witnesses had a claim to an
administrative pretransfer hearing.
135. Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969). For a discussion of alternative delivery modes
see Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 831-32 (1977). Authorities can confiscate a check sent by
one prisoner to another in payment for such services. Henderson v. Ricketts, 499 F. Supp. 1066
(D. Colo. (1980).
136. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977) (dimensions of a minimum law collection are
described at 819 n.4); Jensen v. Satran, 303 N.W.2d 568 (N.D. 1981). The obligation to provide
state legal materials to a state prisoner transferred to federal custody in another state rests on
federal, not transferring state, officials. Goodnow v. Perrin, 421 A.2d 1008 (N.H. 1980).
137. LSOP, supra note 5, § 23-2.3(a). See also DOJ, supra note 11, § 1.05; ACA-ACI, supra
note 10, § 2-4326.
138. Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 413-14 (1974). Interception and copying letters
for purposes of a criminal investigation unrelated to institutional security considerations vio-
lated federal and state constitutional rights. State v. Sheriff, 619 P.2d 181 (Mont. 1980).
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only be inspected for contraband.1 39 Nor can correspondence with religious
counselors or functionaries be limited unreasonably. 140 Correspondence
among prison inmates, however, may be barred or regulated, 14 1 and authori-
ties may proscribe libelous or obscene contents 142 or material which clearly
is inflammatory and subversive of institutional discipline.'
43
The Standards provide that envelopes, packages, or containers sent to or
from prisoners may be opened and inspected to determine if they contain
contraband, with the limitation that communications reasonably antici-
pated to be between prisoners and their counsel may be opened and in-
spected only in an affected prisoner's presence.' 44 Written communications
are not to be read and oral communications intentionally overheard unless
prison administrators have received reliable information that a particular
communication may jeopardize public safety or the security or safety within
a correctional institution, or is being used to further illegal activity.'
45 If
communications are directed to counsel or specified persons or organizations
like courts, officials of the confining authority, state and local chief executive
officers, legislators, grievance system administrators, and paroling authori-
ties, there can be no interception without a court order or specific authoriza-
tion by law.
14 6
The era of closely controlling printed matter ordered or received by
prisoners has largely drawn to a close. The position of the Standards is that
limitations can be imposed on printed materials which otherwise can be
mailed lawfully 147 only if bottomed on the overriding considerations embod-
ied in section 23-1.1.1 4 The latter are broad enough to comprehend the
"publishers only" limitation on casebound books sustained by the Supreme
139. See note 129 supra.
140. Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319 (1972) (listed a prohibition against correspondence with a
Buddhist counselor as an element of improper interference with first amendment rights).
141. See note 108 supra.
142. Carpenter v. South Dakota, 536 F.2d 759 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. dented, 431 U.S. 931
(1977); Aikens v. Jenkins, 534 F.2d 751 (7th Cir. 1976).
143. Wilson v. Prasse, 463 F.2d 109, 113 (3d Cir. 1972) (as long as authorities were not
motivated by racial or religious prejudice in evaluating material).
144. LSOP,ssupra note 5, § 23-6.1(b); the proviso was added by amendment during House of
Delegates consideration. See also DOJ, supra note 11, § 12.05; ACA-ACI, supra note 10, §§ 2-
4338, -4370, -4375-77.
145. LSOP, supra note 5, § 23-6.1(c); note 264 infza. See also DOJ, supra note 11, §§ 12.05-
.06; ACA-ACI, supra note 10, § 2-4375 and discussion.
146. LSOP, supra note 5, § 23-6.1(d). On provision of a reasonable amount of free station-
ery and postage to help indigent prisoners maintain ties with family and friends in the commu-
nity, set § 23-6.1(e); DOJ, supra note 11, § 12.08 (but reasonable limitations on postage
allowance may be imposed on inmates who abuse an unlimited postage allowance policy);
ACA-ACI, supra note 10, § 2-4371. There may be a constitutional dimension to this. Secretary
v. Allen, 286 Md. 133, 406 A.2d 104 (1979) (evidentiary hearing required on lawfulness of limi-
tation to seven paid first-class letters weekly). Under LSOP, supra note 5, § 23-6.1 (1) pay tele-
phones should be available to inmates, a position also taken in DOJ, supra note 11, § 12.10 and
ACA-ACI, supra note 10, § 2-4379, but free calls for indigents are allowed only for communica-
tions with attorneys of record and officials of courts in which their current litigation is pending.
147. LSOP, supra note 5, § 
2 3
-6.1(g); see also DOJ, supra note 11, § 12.01; ACA-ACI, supra
note 10, § 2-4373. Libelous or obscene matter is not mailable. See note 142 supra.
148. See text accompanying note 13 supra. Cf DOJ, supra note 11, § 12.02 (no publication
is rejected solely because its content is religious, philosophical, political, social, or sexual, or




4 9 as well as subject matter which might facilitate assaults or es-
capes.' 50 Refusal to forward or deliver material presumably is a proper sub-
ject for grievance proceedings covering all forms of prisoner complaints.
15 1
5. Visitation
Almost all prison inmates eventually return to the free community.
Therefore, it is important to preserve as many family and community ties as
possible to encourage swift reintegration into society following release. In
many instances today this is accomplished through assignment to commu-
nity corrections centers and work or study release programs in which con-
trols are minimal. 152 The Standards recommend use of home furlough
programs to the extent they are consistent with community and institutional
security. 153
Nevertheless, for most prisoners a more important practical concern is
visitation at correctional facilities by family members and friends. Although
it has been implied that long-term prisoners cannot be denied visits if such a
deprivation will be detrimental to physical or mental health, 154 the more
relevant constitutional standard appears to be that there is no absolute right
to visits. 1 5 5 Consequently, reasonable limitations can be imposed on con-
tacts with casual acquaintances, 156 smuggling of weapons and contraband
149. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 548-53 (1979), embodied in DOJ, supra note 11, § 12.02.
See also Vodicka v. Phelps, 624 F.2d 569 (5th Cir. 1980); Trapnell v. Riggsby, 622 F.2d 290 (7th
Cir. 1980) (sustaining requirement that nude and seminude photographs come from commer-
cial sources, not persons well known to prisoner); Rich v. Luther, 514 F. Supp. 481 (W.D. N.C.
1981); In re Smith, 112 Cal. App. 3d 956, 169 Cal. Rptr. 564 (1980).
150. Cf MICH. ADMIN. CODE R. 791.6603(3) (1977); MICH. DEP'T OF CORRECTIONS DIR.
PD-DWA-64.03 (Feb. 1, 1976), restricting specific information about manufacturing weapons,
explosives, incendiary devices, poisons or dangerous drugs; clearly inflammatory writings in-
cluding but not limited to advocacy of disorder, violence or insurrection against correctional
facilities or personnel; material describing or showing acts of homosexuality, sadism, violent
sexual practice or unlawful sexual behavior; and detailed instruction in martial arts including
judo, karate, aikido, kung fu and similar techniques.
151. LSOP, supra note 5, § 23-7.1(b)-(c). Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974), re-
quired hearings before correspondence can be interrupted. This has been invoked in the setting
of control over incoming publications. Hopkins v. Collins, 547 F.2d 503 (5th Cir. 1977).
152. See NAC CORRECTIONS, supra note 8, §§ 9.9, 16.14.
153. LSOP, supra note 5, § 23-6.2(a); see a/so DOJ, supra note 11, § 12.16; ACA-ACI, upra
note 10, §§ 2-4387, -4419, -4455.
154. Campbell v. McGruder, 580 F.2d 521, 546-48 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (pretrial detention
facility).
155. [l]nstitutional considerations, such as security and related administrative
problems, as well as the accepted and legitimate policy objectives of the corrections
system itself, require that some limitation be placed on . . . visitations. So long as
reasonable and effective means of communication remain open and no discrimination
in terms of content is involved, we believe that, in drawing such lines, "prison officials
must be accorded latitude."
Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 826 (1974). Racial discrimination in according visitation privi-
leges denies equal protection. Thomas v. Brierley, 481 F.2d 660 (3d Cir. 1973). On visitation
restrictions affecting death row inmates, see Wilson v. Nevada Dep't of Prisons, 511 F. Supp. 750
(D. Nev. 1981).
156. Lynott v. Henderson, 610 F.2d 340 (5th Cir. 1980) (authorities could bar visits by
women under circumstances suggesting their relationship to prisoner was not conducive to reha-
bilitation); Hamilton v. Saxbe, 428 F. Supp. 110 1, 1111-12 (N.D. Ga. 1976), af 'dsub noma. Ham-
ilton v. Bell, 551 F.2d 1056 (5th Cir. 1977). There is obviously no protected claim of access to
consenting sexual partners from among prisoners of the opposite sex, Dodson v. State, 268 Ind.
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can be forestalled through reasonable security measures,' 5 7 and visitor attire
can be subjected to reasonable restrictions. 15  There is no right to conjugal
visits,' 5 9 although some authorities intimate that contact visits may be a pro-
tected right at least for preadjudication detainees. 160
The Standards adopt a position consonant with current precedent that
visits should be encouraged, subject to overriding concerns of institutional
and public safety and order, through provision of reasonable visiting hours,
including weekend and holiday times, for the convenience of visitors.' 6 1 No
specific mention is made of conjugal visits, but it is recommended that ex-
tended visits between prisoners and their families in suitable accommoda-
tions should be allowed those not on home furlough status, 162 which, in the
exercise of administrative discretion, could accomplish the equivalent to con-
jugal visitation. Visiting facilities should be informal and should allow op-
portunities for physical contact. 16 3 Under such circumstances, however,
visitors may be subjected to nonintrusive forms of personal search. 164 A
preference is expressed for minimum visits of one hour each, with a possibil-
ity of cumulating time allotments to facilitate longer visits. ' 65 This is impor-
tant when family members must travel long distances to visit a prisoner.
Prisoners in disciplinary segregation should have the same visitation rights as
667, 377 N.E.2d 1365 (1978), or of the same sex, People v. Coulter, 94 Mich. App. 531, 288
N.W.2d 448 (1980) (no constitutional violation in invoking sodomy statute against prisoners).
157. Magnetometers and like detection devices can be used in public buildings generally,
McMorris v. Alioto, 567 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1978), which presumably would extend to prison
facilities; hand-carried items also are subject to visual inspection. United States v. Kelley, 393
F. Supp. 755 (W.D. Okla. 1975); State v. Colby, 263 S.C. 468, 210 S.E.2d 914 (1975). On
submission to strip searches as a condition to visitation, see Wool v. Hogan, 505 F. Supp. 928 (D.
Vt. 1981) (strip search requirement for visitor suspected of carrying contraband not unreasona-
ble when metal detectors could not detect contraband like drugs carried beneath clothing); In re
French, 106 Cal. App. 3d 74, 164 Cal. Rptr. 800 (1980) (could not suspend visiting privileges of
five women who refused strip searches not shown to be reasonably related to institutional secur-
ity). Before visitors can be subjected to other forms of search and seizure, adequate legal
grounds must exist independent of the fact they are visitors--stop-and-frisk or personal search
following a legal arrest being the most usual. State v. Custodio, 607 P.2d 1048 (Haw. 1980)
(strip search reasonable); State v. Hall, 292 N.W.2d 749 (Minn. 1980).
158. Holdman v. Olim, 59 Haw. 346, 581 P.2d 1164 (1978) (female visitors could be re-
quired to wear suitable garments).
159. McCray v. Sullivan, 509 F.2d 1332 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 859 (1975). See also
n.156 supra. It was held unreasonable to deny contact visits between preconviction detainees
and their young children when suitable facilities were available to accommodate such visits. In
re Smith, 112 Cal. App. 3d 956, 169 Cal. Rptr. 564 (1980).
160. Rhem v. Malcolm, 507 F.2d 333, 337 (2d Cir. 1974); Cooper v. Morin, 49 N.Y.2d 69,
399 N.E.2d 1188, 424 N.Y.S.2d 168 (1979), cert denied, 446 U.S. 984 (1980); Wickham v. Fisher,
629 P.2d 896 (Ut. 1981); contra, Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101
S. Ct. 1759 (1981); Jordan v. Wolke, 615 F.2d 749 (7th Cir. 1980); Inmates of Allegheny County
Jail v. Pierce, 612 F.2d 754 (3d Cir. 1979); Feeley v. Sampson, 570 F.2d 364, 373 (1st Cir. 1978).
On a need to show that protracted denial of contact visits likely will affect physical or mental
health, see Campbell v. McGruder, 580 F.2d 521 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
161. LSOP,supra note 5, § 23-6.2(b), cross-referencing § 23-1.1. Seealso DOJ,supra note 11,
§ 12.12; ACA-ACI, supra note 10, §§ 2-4380-81, -4385.
162. LSOP, supra note 5, § 23-6.2(c); see a/so DOJ, supra note 11, § 12.13; ACA-ACI, supra
note 10, § 2-4384.
163. LSOP, supra note 5, § 23-6.2(c); see a/so DOJ, supra note 11, § 12.12; ACA-ACI, supra
note 10, § 2-4383.
164. LSOP, supra note 5, § 23-6.2(d); see also ACA-ACI, supra note 10, § 2-4382.
165. LSOP, supra note 5, § 23-6.2(e). Visits with counsel, clergy and public officials are not
to count against visiting periods and should be unlimited in number.
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those in the general prison population, subject only to considerations of insti-
tutional security and order. 166
Although for the most part prisoners should be allowed to receive
whomever they wish, subject to frequency limitations and scheduling re-
quirements, the Standards recognize that correctional authorities may dis-
qualify for good cause certain people as visitors. 167 Examples include abuse
of visitation regulations on earlier occasions' 6a and reasonable suspicion that
criminal activity may ensue.169 Exclusion of visitors is subject to prisoner
grievance proceedings. 1
70
Many if not most American prisons are remote from metropolitan cen-
ters from which the bulk of their inmates are sentenced. Regardless of
whether or not this poses a constitutional issue, t7 1 prison administrators
should do whatever they can to facilitate visits by providing local transporta-
tion and furnishing information about transportation alternatives.'
72
6. Visits by Media Representatives and Groups
It is implicit if not express in American constitutional decisions that the
right of prisoners to communicate with members of the public generally car-
ries with it a right to contact the press and other communications media, '
73
It is doubtful that the first amendment supports a direct claim by communi-
cations media representatives to initiate interviews with prisoners whom they
select, 1 74 although an absolute ban on access to penal facilities by the media
and public might produce a constitutional infringement. 175 The Standards
endorse a position that correctional authorities should accommodate media
and public group requests to visit correctional institutions, provided visits
are conducted so as to safeguard the privacy and dignity of inmates and
166. Id § 23-6.3; see also DOJ, supra note 11, § 12.14; ACA-ACI, supra note 10, §§ 2-4227, -
4381.
167. LSOP, supra note 5, § 23-6.2(d); stee also DOJ, supra note 11, § 12.12; ACA-ACI, supra
note 10, § 2-4381 (discussion).
168. See Patterson v. WaIters, 363 F. Supp. 486 (W.D. Pa. 1973) (wife earlier had passed
controlled substance to inmate husband).
169. Rowland v. Wolff, 336 F. Supp. 257 (D. Neb. 1971) (sister and sister-in-law believed to
have smuggled in pistol and ammunition later discovered in prison chapel).
170. LSOP, supra note 5, § 23-6.2(d). In Rowland v. Wolff, 336 F. Supp. 257 (D. Neb.
1971), the court accepted as sufficient an administrative inquiry which concluded that female
relatives in fact had introduced a weapon into the facility, even though it had not been discov-
ered in the inmate relative's possession).
171. See Ali v. Gibson, 631 F.2d 1126 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1129 (1981) (re-
versing district court order voiding assignment to mainland federal prison making it very diffi-
cult for family members to visit him); Goodnow v. Perrin, 421 A.2d 1008 (N.H. 1980)
(burdensome transfer to federal institution in another state, rendering it difficult to manage
family visits, was not cruel and unusual punishment).
172. LSOP, supra note 5, § 23-6.2(0; DOJ, supra note 11, § 12.15; ACA-ACI, supra note 10,
2-4385 (discussion), -4386.
173. Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974), in disallowing a press claim to interview selected
inmates, noted the availability of communications and visitations between prisoners and press
representatives. Decisions indicating such a prisoner right to exist include Main Road v. Aytch,
565 F.2d 54 (3d Cir. 1977); Taylor v. Sterrett, 532 F.2d 462, 481-82 (5th Cir. 1976); Nolan v.
Fitzpatrick, 451 F.2d 545 (1st Cir. 1971).
174. Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974).
175. Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1 (1978), contains dicta from which such a conclu-
sion may be inferred.
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promote institutional security and order.' 76 Conversations conducted under
such circumstances should be monitored only under emergency
circumstances. 1
77
H. Miscellaneous Claims or Rights
1. Prisoner Publications
The first amendment does not guarantee prisoners freedom to publish
intramural newspapers and the like,' 78 although administrators may well
consider that a helpful step toward maintaining inmate morale. If prisoner
publications are allowed, regulations controlling them are presumed
valid. 179 Some courts have ruled that administrative due process governs
official censorship of contents,'18 while others are satisfied with a more infor-
mal consultative approach.'"' Contents improper in incoming publications,
if proposed for internal dissemination,18 2 should be subject to censorship as a
reasonable exercise of power in the interests of institutional security and
discipline. '
8 3
The ABA position is that newspapers and other communications media
by and for prisoners should be encouraged within limits of resources and
facilities.' 8 4 The expectation is that prisoners themselves must bear the
costs, although naturally no bar is intended to use of public funds and facili-
ties for the purpose. Advance review of content is appropriate so that per-
sons or groups under attack can be given a contemporaneous opportunity to
reply, 18 5 and material can be excised which is not within first amendment
protection or otherwise not publishable because it constitutes a substantial
threat to institutional security.' 8 6 Objections to administrative interference
with prisoner communications media should be lodged under grievance ma-
176. LSOP, supra note 5, § 23-6.4; see also DOJ, supra note 11, § 1.14; ACA-ACI, supra note
10, § 2-4339.
177. The provision cross-refers to § 23-6.1(c)-(d), which requires reliable information that a
particular communication may jeopardize public safety or institutional security or safety, or is
being used in furtherance of illegal activity; if counsel or certain public authorities participate, a
court order or authorization by law is necessary. See text accompanying notes 144-45 supra, 262
infia .
178. The Luparar v. Stoneman, 382 F. Supp. 495 (D. Vt. 1974), appeal dimissed, 517 F.2d
1395 (1975).
179. Pittman v. Hutto, 594 F.2d 407 (4th Cir. 1979).
180. Spates v. Manson, 644 F.2d 80 (D. Conn. 1981) (officials must make factual showing of
substantial risk of violence or disorder to censor article in prison newspaper); The Luparar v.
Stoneman, 382 F. Supp. 495 (D. Vt. 1974); Laaman v. Hancock, 351 F. Supp. 1265 (D. N.H.
1972).
181. Pittman v. Hutto, 448 F. Supp. 61 (E.D. Va. 1978), aftd, 594 F.2d 407 (4th Cir. 1979).
182. See notes 141-42, 150 supra.
183. Vodicka v. Phelps, 624 F.2d 569 (5th Cir. 1980); Blue v. Hogan, 553 F.2d 960 (5th Cir.
1977). This is the standard governing censorship of correspondence. Procunier v. Martinez, 416
U.S. 396 (1974).
184. LSOP, supra note 5, § 23-6.7(a). See aso MODEL AcT, supra note 9, § 4-124; NAC
CORRECTIONS, supra note 8, § 2.15; ACA-ACI, supra note 10, § 2-4459 (activities generally initi-
ated by inmates under staff supervision).
185. To the extent prison broadcasting stations are subject to FCC regulations an opportu-
nity for reply probably is necessary. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367
(1969).
186. LSOP, supra note 5, § 23-6.7(b).
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chinery provided for elsewhere in the Standards.' 87
2. Confidentiality of Prisoner Records
The ABA is concerned,'8 8 as are accrediting organs,' 89 that prisoner
records and other institutional data compilations specific enough to enable
individual prisoners to be identified be held confidential unless: (a) a pris-
oner concerned consents; (b) the disclosure is made to an official or agency
requesting in writing that the material be available in connection with a
criminal investigation; (c) the material is solicited for statistical, research or
reporting purposes in a form adequate to forestall identifying particulars
concerning individual prisoners; or (d) disclosure is required by a valid
court order. The Standards also endorse a claim by prisoners to have access to
their files to inspect and copy information as long as it does not constitute
diagnostic opinion which might seriously disrupt a program of rehabilita-
tion,'90 reveal sources of information obtained under a promise of confiden-
tiality,' 9 ' create a possibility of physical or other harm to any other person,
or jeopardize prison security if disclosed. 192 Prisoners believing that infor-
mation in their files or prison records to which they have been given access is
inaccurate should be allowed to request its amendment. 193
3. Voting
The fourteenth amendment by its terms permits states to forfeit the
right of convicted felons to vote. 194 Preconviction detainees not under a
187. Id §§ 23-6.7(c), -7.1. See text accompanying notes 210-26 infra.
188. LSOP, supra note 5, § 23-6.11(a).
189. DOJ, supra note 11, § 21.18; ACA-ACI, supra note 10, §§ 2-4120, -4125-26; ACA-ACA,
supra note 10, §§ 73, 78.
190. Cf decisions creating a psychotherapists' privilege against revealing information criti-
cal to a confidential therapeutic relationship. Allired v. State, 554 P.2d 411 (Alaska 1976); In re
"B", 482 Pa. 471, 394 A.2d 419 (1978). The Standard urge a privilege for all information given
by prisoners to correctional employees serving in a counseling relationship unless the informa-
tion bears on a contemplated crime or disclosure is required by court order. LSOP, supra note 5,
§ 23-6.11 (c).
191. Cf a similar restriction under the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552. Id
§ 552(b)(7)(D) states:
(b) This section does not apply to matters that are:
(7) investigatory records compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the
extent that the production of such records would ... (D) disclose the identity of
a confidential source and, in the case of a record compiled by a criminal law
enforcement authority in the course of a criminal investigation, or by an agency
conducting a lawful national security intelligence investigation, confidential in-
formation furnished only by the confidential source....
See Nix v. United States, 572 F.2d 998 (4th Cir. 1978).
192. LSOP, spra note 5, § 23-6.11. See also DOJ, supra note II, § 21.19; ACA-ACI, supra
note 10, § 2-4123.
193. LSOP, supra note 5, § 23-6.1 l(b). A prisoner has a constitutional right to clear a file of
material concerning affiliation with a political movement. Bukhari v. Hutto, 487 F. Supp. 1162
(E.D. Va. 1980) (Black Liberation Army).
194. Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24 (1974). Arbitrary legislative classifications, how-
ever, can deny equal protection. Hobson v. Pow, 434 F. Supp. 362 (N.D. Ala. 1977) (equal
protection was denied when men convicted of battering their wives were disfranchised but not
wives similarly convicted of assaulting husbands); ef Shepherd v. Trevino, 575 F.2d 1110 (5th
Cir. 1978), cerl. denied, 439 U.S. 1129 (1979) (no equal protection problem in allowing successful
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valid felony conviction must, however, be given opportunities for absentee
registration and voting.' 95 Nevertheless, whatever the federal constitutional
doctrine, the position of the ABA is that conviction should not work a depri-
vation of the franchise, whether through automatic operation of law or the
action or inaction of governmental officials.' 96 The Standards recognize a
practical political problem which can result if convicted felons are allowed
both to retain the vote and to establish voting residence in the locale of their
incarceration. A large voting prisoner population in a rural county might
well assert a controlling leverage in local government. Accordingly, prison-
ers should not be authorized to establish a voting domicile solely on the basis
of physical presence in an institution, but instead should be allowed absentee




Prisoners have absolute freedom to believe as they will' 98 and to express
their beliefs in writing to others.' 99 They have no absolute right to form
prisoner organizations and to engage in collective activity directed against
prison administrations. 200 Nor can they insist on opportunities to partici-
pate in activities of outside organizations not unreasonably viewed by correc-
tional authorities as inimical to prisoner rehabilitation or institutional
discipline and order.
20 1
The ABA standard20 2 adopts a somewhat more liberal stance than con-
state probationers to regain franchise while not extending the same benefit to successful federal
probationers resident in the state).
195. O'Brien v. Skinner, 414 U.S. 524 (1974); see Goosby v. Osser, 409 U.S. 512 (1973); cf
Tate v. Collins, 496 F. Supp. 205 (W.D. Tenn. 1980).
196. LSOP, supra note 5, § 23-8.4.
197. Id This is the position taken by some state courts. Dane v. Board of Registrars, 374
Mass. 152, 371 N.E.2d 1358 (1978); Emery v. State, 177 Mont. 73, 580 P.2d 445 (1978), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 874 (1979).
198. Jones v. Prisoners' Labor Union, 433 U.S. 119, 136 (1977); Bukhari v. Hutto, 487 F.
Supp. 1162 (E.D. Va. 1980).
199. Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied sub nom. Sostre v. Oswald,
404 U.S. 1049 (1972). Correspondence and internal publications advocating prisoners' rights
and criticizing prison officials cannot be censored or banned. Guajardo v. Estelle, 580 F.2d 748,
760-61 (5th Cir. 1978); United States ex re. Larkins v. Oswald, 510 F.2d 583 (2d Cir. 1975).
200. Jones v. Prisoners' Labor Union, 433 U.S. 119, 132 (1977). Prison authorities can ban
meetings by groups until the latter have been given official recognition. Preast v. Cox, 628 F.2d
292 (4th Cir. 1980).
201. Jones v. Prisoners' Labor Union, 433 U.S. 119, at 136. The Court noted, however, the
desirability of contacts with outside organizations and individuals who may aid prisoner reha-
bilitation and postrelease reintegration in society. In contrast, the California Supreme Court
has ruled that although prison union meetings can be prohibited in the reasonable interests of
institutional security, In re Price, 25 Cal. 3d 448, 600 P.2d 1330, 158 Cal. Rptr. 873 (1979), state
legislation guaranteeing civil rights to prisoners forestalls a blanket ban against prisoner union
buttons worn by inmates, In re Reynolds, 25 Cal. 3d 131, 599 P.2d 86, 157 Cal. Rptr. 892 (1979),
or correspondence from a paroled union officer to incarcerated union members. In re Brandt, 25
Cal. 3d 136, 599 P.2d 89, 157 Cal. Rptr. 894 (1979). It is not a first amendment violation to
allow volunteers from religious groups to visit jail inmates as long as their preaching is not
forced on uninterested inmates. Campbell v. Cauthron, 623 F.2d 503 (8th Cir. 1980).
202. LSOP, supra note 5, § 23-6.6(a). See also DOJ, supra note 11, § 1.13; ACA-ACI, supra




stitutional precedent requires, in that it encourages lawful organizations and
their activities within prison confines, subject to considerations of public
safety and institutional security and order.20 3 The position is clear, however,
that the ABA does not endorse a right on the part of prisoners to strike or to




The ABA endorses a standard of privacy of living quarters for prisoners,
consistent with their security classification, 20 5 and freedom from sexual dis-
crimination.20 6 These provisions must be administered against the statutory
background of federal legislation forbidding sex-based discrimination and
requiring bona fide occupational qualifications for assignments based on
gender.20 7 Prisoner privacy cannot, therefore, be accomplished through a
ban against assignments of staff members to custodial supervision of inmates
of the opposite sex, 20 8 but instead must rest on special training on supervis-




Although it is not clear that due process requires a grievance mecha-
nism to resolve prisoner complaints, 2t0 establishment of formal grievance
procedures by legislative or administrative action 2 1 is most advantageous to
courts and administrators because thereafter a failure of prisoners to invoke
them means they have not exhausted available administrative remedies. Ex-
haustion of administrative remedies is a prerequisite to federal habeas
203. E.g., guards can be stationed at religious meetings. United States cx rel. Jones v. Run-
die, 453 F.2d 147 (3d Cir. 1971); Cooper v. Pate, 382 F.2d 518 (7th Cir. 1967). Participation by
nonprisoners should be encouraged. LSOP, supra note 5, § 23-6.6(a). See also DOJ, supra note
11, § 19.01; ACA-ACI, supra note 10, §§ 2-4455-56.
204. LSOP, supra note 5, §§ 23-4.2, -6.6(c).
205. Id § 23-6.14(b).
206. Id § 23-6.15.
207. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 104b, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(b) (1975). See Dothard v. Raw]-
inson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977), on qualifications for employment as a correctional officer.
208. Forts v. Ward, 621 F.2d 1210 (2d Cir. 1980); Gunther v. Iowa State Men's Reform.,
612 F.2d 1079 (8th Cir.), cerl. denied, 446 U.S. 966 (1980).
209. Sterling v. Cupp, 290 Or. 611, 625 P.2d 123 (1981).
210. Some federal courts have incorporated such proceedings in comprehensive orders ad-
ministering state prisons or prison systems based on the Federal Civil Rights Act. See, e.g.,
Taylor v. Perini, 455 F. Supp. 1241, 1252 (N.D. Ohio 1978), modifed, 477 F. Supp. 1289 (N.D.
Ohio 1979); Laaman v. Helgemoe, 437 F. Supp. 269 (D. N.H. 1977). The first amendment right
of petition includes a right to file complaints with prison administrators, Stovall v. Bennett, 471
F. Supp. 1286, 1290 (M.D. Ala. 1979), but does not cover group petitions which, in the reason-
able thinking of prison officials, may jeopardize institutional security. Nickens v. White, 622
F.2d 967 (8th Cir.), cert. dented, 449 U.S. 1018 (1980); In re Price, 25 Cal. 3d 448, 600 P.2d 1330,
158 Cal. Rptr. 873 (1979).
211. Recently established federal procedures are contained in 28 C.F.R. §§ 542.10-16
(1980); see 44 Fed. Reg. 62248-51 (1979). See also LSOP (Tent. Draft No. 1), supra note 4, at
579-82, commentary.
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corpus,21 2 damage actions based directly on the eighth amendment, 21 3 ac-
tions under the Federal Civil Rights Act, 21 4 contempt actions alleging fail-
ure to comply with federal district court regulatory orders,21 5 or state
appellate review of administrative activity. 21 6 Grievance procedures also
may generate a comprehensive record reducing the scope of or eliminating
the need for federal district court hearings. 21 7 Although every effort should
be made to resolve prisoner grievances informally as far as possible, 2 18 the
ABA urges the adoption of grievance procedures to resolve complaints con-
cerning institutional policies, rules, practices and procedures. 2 19 These pro-
cedures should not serve as devices to review specific dispositions on the
merits by internal adjudicative bodies like parole, classification and discipli-
nary boards. 220 The intent of the Standards is that the latter determinations
be reviewable through normal administrative review mechanisms estab-
lished under a state administrative procedures act.
22 1
To facilitate and standardize grievance procedures, special forms should
be provided so that grievants may note briefly the nature of their com-
plaints, the administrators involved and the remedy sought.222 The essen-
tials of a fair grievance proceeding are recapitulated in the Standards:
223
(a) a written response to each grievance containing reasons for the decision;
(b) reasonable time limits within which a response must be given;
224
(c) advisory review of grievances; and (d) a method of resolving jurisdic-
tional issues. Grievances should be possible over a broad array of issues,
225
and prisoners should have adequate assurances against reprisals based on
grievance filings.
226
Correctional administration within an institution should be subject to
212. Antonelli v. Ralston, 609 F.2d 340 (8th Cir. 1979) (federal prisoner); Mason v. Ciccone,
531 F.2d 867 (8th Cir. 1976) (requirement does not serve to suspend the writ).
213. Brice v. Day, 604 F.2d 664 (10th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1086 (1980).
214. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983-85 (1976); Secret v. Brierton, 584 F.2d 823 (7th Cir. 1978). This
applies to actions under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1976) as well. Miller v. Stanmore, 636 F.2d 986 (5th
Cir. 1981).
215. Taylor v. Perini, 455 F. Supp. 1241 (N.D. Ohio 1978), modifmed, 477 F. Supp. 1289
(N.D. Ohio 1979).
216. In re Dexter, 25 Cal. 3d 921, 603 P.2d 35, 160 Cal. Rptr. 118 (1979); Dickerson v.
Warden of Marquette Prison, 99 Mich. App. 630, 298 N.W.2d 841 (1980).
217. Martinez v. Aaron, 570 F.2d 317 (10th Cir. 1978).
218. LSOP, supra note 5, § 23-7.1(a).
219. Id § 23-7.1(b). See also DOJ, supra note 11, § 1.11; ACA-ACI,supra note 10, §§ 2-4343.
Staff and inmates should participate in the design of grievance procedures. LSOP, supra note 5,
§ 23-7.1(d)(v).
220. LSOP, supra note 5, § 23-7.1(b).
221. Id § 23-7.2(a). See also Frazee v. Iowa Bd. of Parole, 248 N.W.2d 80 (Iowa 1976) (pa-
role revocation); Lawrence v. Michigan Dep't of Corrections, 88 Mich. App. 167, 276 N.W.2d
554 (1979) (major misconduct cases are "contested cases" reviewable in designated trial courts
under the state act); contra, Clardy v. Levi, 545 F.2d 1241 (9th Cir. 1976) (major disciplinary
proceeding in federal prison system).
222. LSOP, supra note 5, § 23-7.1(c). Use of standard forms may be made a condition to
availability of a grievance procedure. Mahler v. Slattery, 489 F. Supp. 798 (E.D. Va. 1980).
223. LSOP, supra note 5, § 23-7.1(d).
224. A recommended period is 30 working days; a failure to respond within that period
should be taken as a denial of relief. Id § 23-7. l(d)(ii). A different response time may be neces-
sary in emergencies. Id § 23-7.1(d)(iii).
225. Id §23-7.1(d)(vii).
226. Id § 23-7.1(d)(vi).
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inspection by administrative authorities at the departmental level who act
outside institutional staff structure and usual channels of management con-
trol.22 7 The approved edition of the Standards does not advocate establish-
ment of the office of a special correctional ombudsman or mediator as did
the first tentative draft.228 If such a functionary is established, however,
oversight jurisdiction should extend to receipt and investigation of prisoner
complaints.
229
II. CONTROL AND DISCIPLINE OF PRISONERS
A. Use of Force
Incarceration inevitably requires the use of force to maintain discipline,
security and order. Consequently, prison administrations should develop de-
tailed policies governing use of all levels of force and provide for their peri-
odic documented review and revision. 230 There are certain legal limitations
in light of which institutional policies must be administered. Prison adminis-
trators cannot use force of any kind, including chemical sprays and the
like,2 3' for purposes of punishment because that would violate the eighth
amendment ban against cruel and unusual punishment. 232 A basic princi-
ple is that no more force may be used than is reasonably necessary to cope
with the particular circumstances. 233 Nondeadly physical force is the stan-
dard. Chemical devices are not to be used routinely and affected prisoners
must be given immediate physical examinations and medical treatment.
234
Deadly force, according to principles applied to law enforcement officers
generally,235 may be used only in necessary defense of prison personnel, in-
227. Id § 23-7.3(a). High-level departmental oversight is necessary even though other state
agencies have investigating or reporting authority on the pattern of the federal General Ac-
counting Office. Id § 23-7.3 and commentary.
228. See LSOP (Tent. Draft No. 1), supra note 4, at 574-78; MODEL AcT, supra note 9, § 4-
201 and comment. It is, however, ABA policy that such systems ought to be established, a
policy which did not require restatement in the Standards. See 96 ABA REPORTS 541-42 (1971);
94 ABA REPORTS 119-21 (1969).
229. LSOP, supra note 5, § 23-7.3(b).
230. Id § 23-6.12. More detailed guidelines than those in LSOP may be found, e.g., in
DOJ, supra note 11, §§ 6.17-.33, 21.08-.09; ACA-ACI, supra note 10, §§ 2-4096-98, -4185-91.
231. Lock v. Jenkins, 641 F.2d 488 (7th Cir. 1981); Spain v. Procunier, 600 F.2d 189 (9th
Cir. 1979); McCargo v. Mister, 462 F. Supp. 813, 819 (D. Md. 1978); Donahue v. Maynard, 437
F. Supp. 47 (D. Kan. 1977). Institutions are not required constitutionally, however, to issue
regulations governing MACE and tear gas use. LeBlanc v. Foti, 487 F. Supp. 272 (E.D. La.
1980).
232. Inmates of Attica Correctional Facility v. Rockefeller, 453 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1971); Har-
rah v. Leverette, 271 S.E.2d 322 (W. Va. 1980); Stateex re. K.W. & CW. v. Werner, 242 S.E.2d
907 (W. Va. 1978). However, an isolated attack by a guard is not punishment under the eighth
amendment; the latter requires action for a penal or disciplinary purpose authorized by a higher
prison authority. George v. Evans, 620 F.2d 495 (5th Cir. 1980); Harrah v. Leverette, 271
S.E.2d 322 (W. Va. 1980).
233. Necessary physical contacts by custodial officers are privileged. Picariello v. Fenton,
491 F. Supp. 1026 (M.D. Pa. 1980).
234. Stringer v. Rowe, 616 F.2d 993 (7th Cir. 1980) (power to use force against individual
prisoners is more limited than to quell general disturbances).
235. Quals v. Parrish, 534 F.2d 690 (6th Cir. 1976); Jones v. Marshall, 528 F.2d 132 (2d
Cir. 1975). Excessive force constitutes a Federal Civil Rights Act violation. Russ v. Ratliff, 538
F.2d 799 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denzid, 429 U.S. 1041 (1977); Kyle v. City of New Orleans, 353 So.
2d 969 (La. 1977).
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mates or other persons or in forestalling escape. In actual or threatened
emergencies, inmates can be physically confined to quarters until institu-
tional order is assured.2 36 Personal restraints like handcuffs, irons and strait-
jackets are to be used only if necessary to prevent individual prisoners from
escaping during transfer or injuring themselves or others.
237
The Standards essentially restate these principles. 238 In particular, in-
stances should be minimized in which physical or life-endangering force
need be invoked. 239 Deadly force2 4° can be used to prevent escape from
facilities used primarily to house felony convicts unless the employee using
that force actually knows either that the escaping person has not been
charged with or convicted of a felony involving violence, or that the escapee
is unlikely to endanger human life or inflict serious bodily harm on someone
if not prevented from escaping. If an institution houses misdemeanants or
preconviction detainees, deadly force necessary to forestall escape can be
used only if the user of the force knows there is a substantial risk that the
escaping individual will cause death or serious bodily harm unless prevented
from escaping, or believes in the exercise of on-site professional judgment
that lesser force would fail or endanger other lives. 24 1 Deadly force cannot
be used to prevent destruction of property or maintain institutional security
unless there is an independent basis in the law of the jurisdiction governing
self-defense or defense of others. 242 Whenever force of any sort is used, cor-
rectional administrators should require reports which should be promptly
reviewed for factual sufficiency, supplemented by additional factual investi-
gations if needed.
24 3
B. Search and Sezure
Imprisoned persons have a much reduced scope of constitutional protec-
tion against various forms of search and seizure, compared to citizens in free
society, because of supervening considerations of institutional security and
order and a need to prevent introduction of contraband substances into a
236. Saunders v. Packel, 436 F. Supp. 618 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
237. Bono v. Saxbe, 620 F.2d 609 (7th Cir. 1980); Spain v. Procunier, 600 F.2d 189 (9th Cir.
1979); Picariello v. Fenton, 491 F. Supp. 1026 (M.D. Pa. 1980). Drugs should never be used as a
restraining mechanism for security purposes. DOJ, supra note 11, § 6.18.
No due process administrative hearing is required to "lock down" a penal institution for
several months after a period of rioting. Hayward v. Procunier, 629 F.2d 599 (9th Cir. 1980).
238. LSOP, supra note 5, § 23-6.12(a). A corollary is that an appropriate array of control
devices and weapons should be provided within an institution, id § 23-6.12(b), and regularly
inspected, id § 23-6.12(c); care should be exercised in the assignment of staff to positions in
which force, including deadly force, may have to be used, and proper entry and ongoing educa-
tion must be provided for and participated in by persons receiving such assignments. Id
239. Id. § 23-6.12(a)(i).
240. Deadly force is defined to include "force that a trained and authorized professional
employee uses with the purpose of causing, or which he or she knows will create a substantial
risk of causing, death or serious bodily harm." Id § 23-6.12(a)(iii).
241. Id. § 23-6.12(a)(ii)(A)(2). Note that what is contemplated is a good-faith subjective
evaluation by the correctional employee concerned, not an objective reasonable person standard
as in orthodox criminal law.
242. Id § 23-6.12(a)(ii)(B). Unreasonable interpretations of circumstances would render
correctional employees criminally liable if death or physical injury of a prisoner or another
ensued. See MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 3.04 (P.O.D. 1962), 210.4 (1981).
243. LSOP, supra note 5, § 23-6.12(d).
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prison setting. 244 Therefore, there is no requirement that advance judicial
authorization be obtained before prisoner living quarters can be searched, or
sanitation or safety inspections conducted. Nor does the fourth amendment
require that prisoners be physically present during search of living quarters
or personal property.
245
The Standards expand the constitutional minima in some respects. No
special authorization of any sort is required for searches of areas of an insti-
tution other than prisoner living quarters, 24 6 and routine periodic visual in-
spection of prisoner living areas can be undertaken by correctional
authorities, without specific advance authorization, to confirm compliance
with health, safety and security regulations. 24 7 Both routine and random
shakedown inspections can be conducted without a special underlying cause
but should be authorized in advance by the chief or acting chief executive of
an institution. 248 If, however, an intrusive living quarters search is neither
routine nor random, but is focused on an individual, the ABA recommends
advance written authorization by a supervisor of the employees carrying out
the search, based on a reasonable belief that contraband 249 or other prohib-
ited material will be found.250 Immediate search can be made if a correc-
tional officer reasonably believes material which is sought would be disposed
of while the otherwise necessary prior approval is obtained.25t All searches
of prisoner quarters and possessions should be conducted so that damage to
property and invasion of privacy are kept to a minimum. 252 Written reports
should be prepared concerning all searches for which advance authorization
244. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979); United States v. Ready, 574 F.2d 1009 (10th Cir.
1978); United States v. Stumes, 549 F.2d 831 (8th Cir. 1977); Hudson v. State, 196 Colo. 211,
585 P.2d 580 (1978); State v. Dauzat, 364 So. 2d 1000 (La. 1978); Thomas v. State, 285 Md.
458, 404 A.2d 257 (1979). Guards searching for weapons and contraband after a riot acted
improperly in seizing and reading an inmate's diary, since they had no reasonable expectation
of finding evidence there about prisoner participation in the riot. DiGiuseppe v. Ward, 514 F.
Supp. 503 (S.D. N.Y. 1981). On the status of property of prisoners on work release status,
compare State v. Nunziato, 178 N.J. Super. 216, 428 A.2d 564 (1981) (work release supervisor
properly could conduct warrantless search of defendant's home, where he had permission to go
for lunch, because defendant was like prisoner rather than parolee), with Commonwealth v.
Gabrielle, 409 A.2d 1173 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1979) (locker at place of work release employment not
subject to warrantless search).
245. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 557 (1979).
246. LSOP, supra note 5, § 23-6.10(a).
247. Id § 23-6.10(b).
248. Id § 23-6.10(c).
249. The Standards do not define contraband in this context and other contexts like inspec-
tion of correspondence under § 23-6.1. The Supreme Court used a formulation of "money,
drugs, weapons, and other contraband," Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979), and state
courts have approved and applied statutory definitions like "any tool or other thing that may be
used to facilitate [escape] or any other thing which a person confined in official custody is pro-
hibited by statute or regulation from making or possessing," ME. REV. STAT. tit. 17-A, § 756
(Supp. 1977); State v. Bishop, 392 A.2d 20 (Me. 1978), and "any article or thing which a person
confined . . . is prohibited by statute, rule, regulation or order from obtaining or possessing,
and whose use would endanger the safety or security of such institution or any person therein."
OR. REv. STAT. § 162.135(1) (1977); State v. Meyer, 283 Or. 449, 583 P.2d 553 (1978).
250. LSOP, supra note 5, § 23-6,10(d).
251. Id, proviso.
252. Id § 23-6.10(e). Intentional or negligent deprivation of prisoner property does not vio-
late the fourteenth amendment unless it is accomplished without due process of law, which is
not the case as far as the Federal Civil Rights Act is concerned unless there is no state tort
remedy available to prisoners. Parratt v. Taylor, 101 S. Ct. 1908 (1981).
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is required or which result in seizure of contraband or other forbidden mate-
rial. If property is taken, a copy of the report or a portion of it should be
given an affected prisoner as a receipt.
25 3
Physical searches of prisoners are indispensable in many situations, for
example, following transportation outside institutional confines or contact
visits. The Supreme Court found no constitutional infringement in visual
inspections of body cavities following contact visits,2 54 although there might
be an infringement of personal privacy if searches of that sort are not con-
ducted in private by custodial officers of the same sex.2 55 The Standards urge
detailed regulation of physical searches through institutional rules. Nonin-
trusive sensors instead of body searches should be used whenever possible.
256
Pat-down searches, however, are appropriate to determine whether prisoners
are carrying contraband or other prohibited material. 257 Strip searches and
visual inspections of body cavities ought to rest on articulable suspicion that
a prisoner is carrying contraband, etc. 258 Digital or instrumental inspection
of anal or vaginal cavities should be authorized in a written document from
the chief executive officer of an institution embodying a factual basis sup-
porting a reasonable belief that the prisoner in question is secreting contra-
band or other prohibited material there.259  The recommendations
concerning written reports and receipts apply in this setting also.
2 6 °
The monitoring of oral communications must rest on reliable informa-
tion that a particular communication may jeopardize the safety of the public
or the safety or security of a correctional institution, or is being used to fur-
ther illegal activity. 26 1 There may, however, be a statutory bar to monitor-
ing telephone conversations without the express permission of one of the
parties to the conversation or - valid court order.
262
253. LSOP, supra note 5, § 2 3 -6 .10(g). No receipt is required by the Constitution, however.
Thornton v. Redman, 435 F. Supp. 876 (D. Del. 1977).
254. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 558 (1979). In Bono v. Saxbe, 620 F.2d 609 (7th Cir.
1980), the court expressed concern over strip searches of prisoners in administrative segregation
before and after noncontact visits.
255. Sterling v. Cupp, 290 Or. 611, 625 P.2d 123 (1981). Cf Lee v. Downs, 470 F. Supp.
188 (E.D. Va. 1979) (male custodial officers controlling strong female prisoner while her cloth-
ing was removed did not act unreasonably under the circumstances).
256. LSOP, supra note 5, § 23-6.10(o)(i).
257. d § 23-6.10(f)(ii).
258. Id § 23-6. 10(f)(iii). Such searches should be conducted by a supervisor in a private
place out of the sight of others, except that the prisoner may request the presence of another
available officer of the institution. Sims v. Brierton, 500 F. Supp. 813 (N.D. Il1. 1980), held it
improper to require a prisoner to submit to anal cavity inspections after visits with a law student
intern aiding him in preparing a deposition, in the absence of a showing of abuse of regulations
by such interns.
259. LSOP, supra note 5, § 23-6. 10(f)(iv). Such searches should be conducted by a medi-
cally trained person, other than another prisoner, in the prison hospital or another private
place; a prisoner may request the presence of another available officer of the institution. Medi-
cally-trained personnel may object to being used for security rather than therapeutic purposes,
so that an institution may have to train custodial staff members in the necessary techniques. See
DOJ, supra note 11, § 6.13 (discussion).
260. LSOP, supra note 5, § 2 3 -6 .10(g); see note 253 supra.
261. LSOP, supra note 5, § 2 3-6.1(c); more stringent limitations govern communications
with counsel and public officials. Id § 23-6. 1(d).
262. Campiti v. Walonis, 611 F.2d 387 (1st Cir. 1979); contra, United States v. Paul, 614
F.2d 115 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 941 (1980) (distinguishing Walonir on the basis it was
1981]
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
C. Disczp/hnagy Rules and Then- Enforcement
Penal statutes provide insufficient criteria for operation of prisons. De-
tailed rules and regulations are required incorporating sanctions for disobe-
dience. There are two dimensions to this: norms must be made known to
those regulated by them, as correctional officials cannot condemn without
prior notice what they find improper;263 and regulations must be specific
enough that inmates know what is prohibited. 264 Sanctions also should be
precise for each infraction.
The Standards urge correctional administrators to promulgate clear,
written rules governing prisoner conduct.2 65 Clarity requires a specific defi-
nition of offenses, schedules of minimum and maximum sanctions applicable
to each infraction, and specific criteria for disciplinary and classification sys-
tems. In particular, a principle of parsimony in sanctioning is advocated:
the least severe punishment appropriate to each infraction is all that should
be imposed. 266 It is essential that all prisoners receive personal notice of
rules and sanctions in a language they can understand, upon entry into an
institution. Supplementary oral explanations should be given if needed.
26 7
More legal problems have arisen from enforcement than from promul-
gation of disciplinary rules. Misconduct which also amounts to a crime
poses an especially sensitive problem. Prison discipline is not criminal pun-
ishment, so double jeopardy does not bar pursuit of both administrative dis-
cipline and criminal prosecution. 268 Nevertheless, investigative acts by
prison authorities, if violative of the fourth, fifth or sixth amendment, can
render evidence inadmissible and thus frustrate prosecution. There also is a
self-incrimination problem under such circumstances. Although prison
hearing officers and boards may consider adversely to prisoners a failure to
not shown there that the monitoring was related to prison security); Rodriguez v. Blaedow, 497
F. Supp. 558 (E.D. Wis. 1980) (prison officials could require all calls to be conducted in English
so that they could monitor calls, citing Christman v. Skinner, 468 F.2d 723 (2d Cir. 1972) (ap-
proving monitoring of nontelephonic conversations)); People v. Myles, 62 Il1. App. 3d 931, 379
N.E.2d 897 (1978).
263. See State ex rel. Gillespie v. Kendrick, 265 S.E.2d 537 (W. Va. 1980) (must publish jail
rules according to which infractions are determined and sanctioned).
264. Se Fichtner v. Iowa State Penitentiary, 285 N.W.2d 751, 759 (Iowa 1979) (prison rules
must be intelligible); ef Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974) (Court invalidated mail
regulations forbidding statements that "magnify grievances," "unduly complain" or "belittle
th[e] staff or our judicial system or anything connected with [the] Department of Corrections,"
or which contain "disrespectful comments" or "derogatory remarks").
265. LSOP, supra note 5, § 23-3.1. See also DOJ, supra note 11, § 10.01; ACA-ACI, supra
note 10, § 2-4345. The first tentative draft of the Standards called for active prisoner participa-
tion in rule-making. LSOP (Tent. Draft No. I), supra note 4, at 572-73). The approved version,
however, goes no further than to endorse promulgation of disciplinary and other rules through
procedures established under an administrative procedure act, LSOP, supra note 5, § 23-7.2(a);
prisoners should be given notice of rules, id § 23-7.2(b), which in practice means under a state
act they will have an opportunity to submit objections or proposed changes before final rule
adoption.
266. LSOP, supra note 5, § 23-3.1 (a)(i). A similar standard of proportionality appears in
DOJ, supra note 11, § 10.01.
267. LSOP, supra note 5, § 23-3.1(b). See also DOJ, supra note 11, § 10.02; ACA-ACI, supra
note 10, §§ 2-4346, -4395. Institution personnel also must be conversant with rules, their ration-
ale and available sanctions. DOJ, supra note 11, § 10.03; ACA-ACI, supra note 10, § 2-4347.
268. Rusher v. Arnold, 550 F.2d 896 (3d Cir. 1977); Pruitt v. State, 266 S.E.2d 779 (S.C.),
cert. dentid, 449 U.S. 1036 (1980).
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refute data showing a violation, 269 statements exacted from prisoners at offi-
cial instance are compelled and cannot be used by the prosecution during
subsequent criminal proceedings (other than perhaps for impeachment).
270
Accordingly, although prosecuting officers legally cannot forbid prison ad-
ministrators from investigating and punishing independently criminal in-
fractions of prison disciplinary rules, the Standards endorse the principle that
prison administrators should take the initiative of laying such matters before
local prosecutors so that a prompt joint determination can be made on
whether or how to proceed.2 7 1 In the interim, prisoners who may be or have
been prosecuted criminally can be confined to quarters or transferred to a
higher security classification.
2 72
Disciplinary proceedings, at least those which may result in loss or for-
feiture of good time credits and thus prolong confinement, 2 73 are subject to
several federal constitutional requirements. First, "advance written notice of
the claimed violation" 274 is required. Second, there must be a hearing at
which a prisoner respondent may "call witnesses and present documentary
evidence in his defense when permitting him to do so will not be unduly
hazardous to institutional safety or correctional goals."'275 Reasonable limits
may be placed on this claim to prevent repetitive statements or to s,. 'cguard
against a risk of reprisal or an undermining of authority. Such a hearing,
however, is not intended to be adversary in the same sense as a criminal
proceeding, so that prisoners have no right to confront sources of adverse
data, and prison authorities need not justify to a prisoner respondent their
decision not to summon a particular witness.
2 76
The Supreme Court refused to require representation by legal counsel
in such hearings. However, in instances of illiterate inmates or matters
269. Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308 (1976).
270. Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967); McCracken v. Corey, 612 P.2d 990 (Alaska
1980); cf. United States v. Garcia, 625 F.2d 162 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 923 (1980)
(trial of prison inmates may make it imperative to shield identity of informers during pretrial
proceedings).
271. LSOP, supra note 5, § 23-3.3(a). See also DOJ, supra note 11, § 10.07; ACA-ACI, supra
note 10, § 2-4344. Prosecutors should reach a charging decision promptly; in the interim, cor-
rectional authorities should exercise care in continuing internal investigations and disciplinary
action lest the rights of public and the right of the prisoner to a fair criminal trial be infringed.
There is no responsibility, however, to suspend disciplinary proceedings.
272. LSOP, supra note 5, § 23-3.3(b). A ninety-day maximum period for special handling is
recommended before formal charges are filed; after charging, special status may continue until
a criminal proceeding is concluded. After disposition of criminal charges, prisoners may be
reclassified and, if disciplinary proceedings were suspended during criminal proceedings, ad-
ministrative action may continue. Id § 23-3.3(c).
273. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 39 (1974); Williams v. Davis, 386 So. 2d 415 (Ala. 1980).
McDonnell applies to procedures resulting in loss of parole eligibility, State ex ret. Meeks v.
Gagnon, 95 Wis. 2d 115, 289 N.W.2d 357 (Wis. App. 1980), and assignment to disciplinary
confinement, Parker v. Cook, 642 F.2d 865 (5th Cir. 1981).
274. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. at 563.
275. Id at 566; Williams v. Davis, 386 So. 2d 415 (Ala. 1980); Cruz v. Oregon State Peni-
tentiary, 48 Or. App. 473, 617 P.2d 644 (1980) (or officials can take witness request as a request
for an administrative investigation of prisoner allegations); State ex re. Irby v. Israel, 95 Wis. 2d
697, 291 N.W.2d 643 (Wis. App. 1980). Prisoners have been held to have a claim to discovery of
exculpatory materials by analogy to United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976), and Brady v.
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). Chavis v. Rowe, 643 F.2d 1281 (7th Cir. 1981).
276. Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 322-23 (1976).
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presenting complex issues on which an inmate, unaided, probably could not
collect and present data necessary for an adequate comprehension of the
case, there can be a claim to aid from another inmate or, if that is not al-
lowed, to adequate substitute assistance "in the form of help from the staff or
from a sufficiently competent inmate designated by the staff."'2 77 This is so
even though the alleged misconduct also is criminal and the right to counsel
will attach in the course of ensuing criminal proceedings. 278
Decision makers must be independent of the officials or employees re-
sponsible for bringing charges.2 79 An adjudicator must prepare "a written
statement . . . as to the evidence relied upon and the reasons for the discipli-
nary action taken." 280 In an unusual situation, certain data may be omitted
from findings because of a concern for individual or institutional safety, but
if this is done an adjudicator should "indicate the fact of the omission" in the
findings. 28 ' Judicial review is not constitutionally required.
28 2
For the most part, the ABA Standards rest on this constitutional law.
They continue to differentiate between hearings for minor and major infrac-
tions, not essaying a black-letter test to distinguish them. 28 3 Other stan-
dards-generating bodies have abandoned the distinction because of the
practical administrative problems it presents.2 8 4 All disciplinary hearings
require written notice within a recommended seventy-two hours after an in-
cident, followed within a recommended twenty-four additional hours by
service of copies of any other written data a tribunal may consider.285 Hear-
ings should ensue within a recommended three days after notice.286 Respon-
dents have the right to be present and to speak in personal defense;28 7 they
also have the right to a written decision based on a preponderance of the
evidence, specifying reasons, promptly and in no event later than a recom-
mended five days after hearings. 288 Further review by the chief executive
277. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. at 570.
278. Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. at 315.
279. Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 495 (1980) (transfer of mentally-ill prisoners; disciplinary
procedure summarized and applied by analogy); Piccirillo v. Wainwright, 382 So. 2d 743 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1980); Harrah v. Leverette, 271 S.E.2d 322 (W. Va. 1980).
280. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. at 563.
281. Id at 565.
282. Riner v. Raines, 409 N.E.2d 575 (Ind. 1980).
283. LSOP, supra note 5, § 23-3.2passin. This builds on the federal constitutional doctrines
described in text accompanying notes 273-76 supra. No test is attempted because courts make
their own ad hoc determinations whether McDonnell el al. govern. McKinnon v. Patterson, 568
F.2d 930 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1087 (1978).
284. DOJ, supra note 11, ch. 10; ACA-ACI, supra note 10, at 91 (introductory note). Minor
matters should be resolved informally if at all possible. DOJ, supra note 11, § 10.04; ACA-ACI,
supra note 10, § 2-4349.
285. LSOP, supra note 5, § 23-3.2(a)(i), (b). Se also DOJ, supra note 11, §§ 10.05, .08-.11;
ACA-ACI, supra note 10, §§ 2-4351, -4357, -4359. Special prehearing detention is dealt with in
LSOP, supra note 5, § 23-3.2(e); DOJ, supra note 11, §§ 10.12-. 13; ACA-ACI, supra note 10, § 2-
4353.
286. LSOP, supra note 5, § 23-3.2(a)(ii), (b). See also DOJ, supra note 11, § 10.12; ACA-ACI,
supra note 10, § 2-4359.
287. LSOP, supra note 5, § 23-3.2(a)(iii), (b). DOJ, supra note 11, § 10.14 and ACA-ACI,
supra note 10, § 2-4360 contemplate the same right unless respondent behavior justifies exclu-
sion (or under DOJ the right is waived in writing).
288. LSOP, supra note 5, § 23-3.2(a)(iv), (b). See also DOJ, supra note 11, § 10.17; ACA-
ACI, supra note 10, §§ 2-4364-65.
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officer of the institution then should be available to an adjudicated respon-
dent within a relatively short period.289 All adjudicators must be
impartial.
2 90
The Standards incorporate the essence of the McDonnell representation
test. 29 1 Prisoner respondents should have access to legal advice and counsel-
ing in advance of hearings governing the length of imprisonment, but should
have no guaranteed right to representation by legal counsel during such
hearings.
292
In major disciplinary hearings respondents may request the attendance
of anyone in the "local prison community" with relevant information and
may examine or cross-examine such a person, subject only to limitation if the
data sought are cumulative. A respondent may be excluded during witness
examination if the physical safety of a person would be endangered by the
presence of a particular witness or a disclosure of the witness's identity.
29 3 If
disciplinary charges are not confirmed after hearings, all references to the
charges and their aftermath must be physically removed from files and the
fact they were brought cannot be used adversely to a prisoner in any way.
294
III. CIVIL DISABILITIES
Part VIII of the Legal Status ofPrsoners Standards covers civil disabilities,
a topic which might well have been lodged in the context of the Sentencing
Alternatives and Procedures Standards,295 but was not. The ABA endorses a ba-
sic policy that, with rare exceptions, all laws or regulations subjecting con-
victed persons to collateral disabilities or penalties, or deprivation of civil
rights, should be repealed. 296 To the extent such collateral consequences of
convictions remain in force, no individual should be subjected to them unless
an administrative hearing is held beforehand to establish that they are neces-
sary to advance an important governmental or public interest. 29 7 Disabili-
ties should be imposed only for fixed periods, at the expiration of which an
affected citizen should have a claim to reconsideration of the appropriateness
of the penalty or disability.298 In either event, the burden should rest on
289. LSOP, supra note 5, § 23-3.2(a)(v); appeal should be lodged within a recommended
five days and resolved within 30, and enforcement of sanctions should be suspended during
appeal unless individual safety or security otherwise will be affected adversely. See also DOJ,
supra note 11, § 10.19; ACA-ACI, supra note 10, § 2-4368 (and § 2-4366, calling for routine
review by wardens of all hearings and sanctions to assure conformity with policy and
regulations).
290. LSOP, supra note 5, § 23-3.2(c). ,Se also DOJ, supra note 11, § 10.09; ACA-ACI, supra
note 10, § 2-4361; note 279 supra.
291. See text accompanying notes 277-78 supra.
292. LSOP, supra note 5, § 23-3.2(a)(iii), commentary and proviso. Both DOJ, supra note
11, § 10.16 and ACA-ACI, supra note 10, § 2-4362 contemplate assistance by staff members
selected by prisoner respondents.
293. LSOP, supra note 5, § 23-3.2(b). Set also DOJ, supra note 11, § 10.15; ACA-ACI, supra
note 10, § 2-4363.
294. LSOP, supra note 5, § 23-3.2(d). See also DOJ, supra note 11, § 10.20; ACA-ACI, supra
note 10, § 2-4367.
295. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUsTIcE, szpra note 1, ch. 18.
296. LSOP, supra note 5, § 23-8.1.
297. Id § 23-8.3(a)-(b).
298. Id § 23-8.3(c). Even during the initial stated period, an individual under disability
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those urging a disability to prove a need for it. 2 9 9 Collateral consequences
also can be forestalled or abrogated through expungement of convictions,




ABA advocacy of abrogating restrictions on voting rights based on pe-
nal convictions has been mentioned. 30 1 The ABA rejects as well the follow-
ing restrictions: loss of entitlements to initiate and defend civil actions under
one's own name; eligibility to serve on juries except during actual confine-
ment, probation or parole; power to execute judicially enforcible documents
and agreements; and status to serve as court-appointed fiduciary except dur-
ing actual confinement. 30 2 Nor should convicted persons lose their eligibility
to marry30 3 or to terminate marriage, 3° 4 be deprived of parental rights, in-
cluding the right to grant or withhold consent to adoption, or be disabled
from adopting children. 30 5 Property and financial rights, including vested
pension eligibility, should remain unaffected by criminal convictions, 30 6 and
efforts by insurance carriers to impose special premium rates on convicted
persons should be officially resisted unless a basis for such rate differentia-
tions is established before state regulatory agencies. 30 7 The Standards recom-
mend a maximum five-year period beyond which criminal convictions
should not be revealed by commercial reporting agencies providing data in
connection with credit or employment.
30 8
Loss of eligibility to engage in various occupations may well frustrate
whatever rehabilitation or deterrence has been accomplished through con-
viction and enforcement of penal sanctions. Therefore, the ABA position is
that barriers to employment because of criminal convictions must rest on the
existence of a substantial relationship between adjudicated criminal activity
and later employment. 30 9 Legislatures should prohibit unreasonable barri-
should be able to obtain relief by showing the disability no longer effectuates the governmental
interest for which it was imposed originally.
299. Id. § 23-8.3(d). If, however, an affected person alleges a conviction has unfairly af-
fected eligibility for private employment, he or she bears the burden of persuasion. See id. § 23-
8.8(a)-(b).
300. Id § 23-8.2.
301. See text accompanying notes 194-97 supra.
302. LSOP, supra note 5, § 23-8.5.
303. Federal district courts disagree about the constitutionality of bans or limitations on
prisoners' eligibility to marry, in light of Zeblocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (invalidating
statute requiring court approval before parent subject to support order could remarry). Compare
Salisbury v. List, 501 F. Supp. 105 (D. Nev. 1980) (limitation unconstitutional), with Wool v.
Hogan, 505 F. Supp. 928 (D. Vt. 1981) (limitation valid). Most state authority sustains the
validity of such prohibitions. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. State, 378 So. 2d 7 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1979); Koerner v. New Jersey Dep't of Correction, 163 N.J. Super. 433, 394 A.2d 1262 (1978).
304. Conviction or confinement alone should not amount to abandonment for purposes of
divorce or child custody, and convicted persons should be given appropriate aid in protecting
their marital and parental status during confinement. LSOP, supra note 5, § 23-8.6(b).
305. Id § 23-8.6(a).
306. Id § 23-8.7(a)-(b).
307. Id § 23-8.7(c).
308. Id § 23-8.7(d). Limited coverage of the problem is found in federal legislation, 15
U.S.C. §, 1681c(a)(5) (1976), but only if a credit line is for $50,000 or under or employment is at
an annual salary of $20,000 or less.
309. LSOP, supra note 5, § 23-8.8(a). Factors bearing on employability include likelihood of
opportunity to commit similar future offenses, time elapsed since conviction, conduct following
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ers by both private 3 10 and public 3 1' employers against hiring criminal con-
victs. The extent to which removal of disabilities is accepted in a jurisdiction
is an index of the degree to which the concept of either rehabilitation or
measured retribution has gained public acceptance.
THE FUTURE ROLE OF THE STANDARDS
Implementation of most of the Standards can be accomplished through
new legislation and rules of court governing criminal proceedings. For the
most part, revision machinery is either under the control of judges and law-
yers or receptive to recommendations from the legal profession. This is not
as true of changes in correctional administration, a field in which there has
been relatively little formal involvement by the legal profession and which
has come under serious judicial scrutiny only in the past decade or so. Es-
tablishing a functional role in correctional reform is much less easy for the
ABA to accomplish than in more directly legal fields.
It is unlikely as well that the ABA can gain a significant foothold in the
recent American phenomenon of accreditation of correctional institutions,
systems and programs. That process was launched less than a decade ago by
the American Correctional Association and is now the responsibility of the
Commission on Accreditation for Corrections. 3 2 The criteria for accredita-
tion have been established from within the world of corrections administra-
tion. The ABA Standards are unlikely to be referred to other than as
background against which accreditation panels can determine sufficiency of
compliance with the more generally phrased ACA Standards.
conviction, the circumstances of crime and offender and the likelihood such circumstances will
reoccur.
310. Id § 23-8.8(b). Protective legislation should cover denial of and discharge from em-
ployment; denial of fair employment conditions, pay or promotion; rejection of membership in
unions or other organizations affecting employment; and denial or revocation of licenses re-
quired for a profession or occupation. The latter also is covered in id § 23-8.8(0, which urges a
substantial relationship between the crime and the occupational activity at issue.
311. Id § 23-8.8(d). "Public employment" is defined in id § 23-8.8(e). Conviction may
justify forfeiture of elective or appointive office, held at the time of conviction, but should not
automatically bar eligibility for future elective or appointive public office. Id § 23-8.8(c).
312. Se generally COMMISSION ON ACCREDITATION FOR CORRECTIONS, ACCREDITATION:
BLUEPRINT FOR CORRECTIONS (1978); Sechrest, The Accreditation Movement in Corrections, 40 FED.
PROB. No. 4, (Dec. 1976). By the end of 1980, nearly 600 correctional facilities and programs
had received or were engaged in preliminary procedures required for accreditation. Commis-
sion on Accreditation for Corrections, 1980 Annual Report (1981). The ten volumes of ACA
STANDARDS, supra note 10, provide compliance criteria in reference to which accreditation is
determined. Applicant institutions or agencies, after being granted candidate status, first con-
duct an elaborate self-evaluation to determine probable compliance levels. They next request a
site inspection by a team of three or four professional consultants retained by the Commission.
The team prepares a comprehensive report on compliance status which then is reviewed by a
panel of five commissioners which meets with representatives of a candidate institution, consid-
ers appeals against audit team recommendations, and confers a three-year accreditation on
agencies in compliance with a stated number of standards. The entire commission serves as an
appeal body if objections are made to denial or deferral of accreditation. Agencies must present
for approval action plans covering standards with which they are in noncompliance. Recertifi-
cation requires repetition of the entire process of self-study, field audit and panel evaluation.
Although in its early years the accreditation process was financed chiefly through LEAA and




Consequently, a more limited scope for ABA implementation activity
may prove possible in the instance of LSOP than is true of all other stan-
dards except possibly the Urban Police Function Standards.3 i3 Its impact may
be twofold only. One is as a statement of policy by the ABA itself, so that
future activities of ABA committees, sections and divisions can be guided by
House of Delegates policy determinations. If the LSOP Standards merit revi-
sion, in the view of any ABA entity, the Standing Committee offers the
mechanism through which recommendations for changes in black-letter text
can be transmitted to the House of Delegates for consideration. The second
is to provide guidelines for courts in state or federal litigation attacking
prison or jail conditions. The ABA Standards are recognized by many correc-
tional authorities as relatively more detailed on legal issues and therefore of
greater intrinsic value as norms than the more succinctly phrased ACA Stan-
dards. They possess the cachet of the world's largest association of legal pro-
fessionals. Therefore, to the extent a jail, prison or prison system in fact
complies with the (minimum) recommendations set forth in LSOP, it is ex-
ceedingly unlikely that a court will find a deprivation of rights guaranteed
by the federal or a state constitution. To the degree a correctional facility or
program falls short of compliance, there is the risk that the ABA Standards, as
well as other standards and guidelines, will be invoked by courts in placing
legal restrictions on correctional administration. 3i 4 Thus, time may estab-
lish that the greatest leverage favoring use of LSOP by prison administrators
and legislators315 will stem from their use as criteria by courts engaged in
constitutional litigation.
313. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 1, ch. 1.
314. The ACA-ACI standards, supra note 10, occasionally have been cited in that way. See,
e.g., Rhodes v. Chapman, 101 S. Ct. 2392, 2397 n.8 (1981); Wolfish v. Levi, 573 F.2d 118, 127
n.20, 128 n.22 (2d Cir. 1978), rev'on other grounds sub nor. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979);
Battle v. Anderson, 457 F. Supp. 719, 727 (E.D. Okla. 1978); Sterling v. Cupp, 625 P.2d 123,
131 n.20 (Or. 1981). The DOJ standards are also cited in Rhodes v. Chapman, 101 S. Ct. at
2400, n.13, 2404 n.6 (Brennan, J., concurring). For a reference to Tentative Draft No. 1 of
LSOP, ste Sterling v. Cupp, 625 P.2d at 131 n. 19, 132 n.22.
315. The Standards urge state legislators to implement their contents and provide sufficient
resources to ensure implementation of prisoners' legal rights. LSOP, supra note 5, § 23-7.4.
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